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I. INTRODUCTION
This review of criminal and federal habeas decisions of the United
States Supreme Court covers highlights of the 1998-99 Term, including se-
lected cases decided in early 1998. These decisions reveal that at the close of
the twentieth century the Court was still fine-tuning its retreat from the War-
ren Court's "Criminal Law Revolution" of the 1960s. The Warren Court had
attempted to create a uniform national code of criminal procedure by making
most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states. By con-
trast, the Rehnquist Court, keeping in step with the law and order philosophy
reflected in Congress' passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, has continued to de- constitutionalize criminal proce-
dure and return power to regulate criminal justice matters back to the states.
Notwithstanding this trend, several of the Court's decisions carve a hard
line in the sand in support of individual rights and show that the Court is not
yet willing to throw the baby out with the bath water. For example, while the
Court cut back on standing to contest Fourth Amendment violations in Min-
nesota v. Carter,' and further reduced Fourth Amendment protection with
respect to searches and seizures of automobiles in Wyoming v. Houghton2
and Florida v. White3, it nevertheless held firm in Knowles v. Iowa,4 refusing
to extend the "search incident to arrest" exception to traffic arrests that result
only in the issuance of a citation. The Court also protected residential pri-
vacy in Wilson v. Lane5 and Hanlon v. Berger,' holding that police may not
bring the media along when they execute a search warrant.
Similarly, in the Fifth Amendment context, while the Court held in
United States v. Balsys7 that fear of foreign criminal prosecution did not pro-
vide grounds for exercising the privilege against self-incrimination in a de-
portation proceeding, it also held by a five-to-four margin in Mitchell v.
United States' that a person who pleads guilty does not thereby waive their
Fifth Amendment rights with respect to sentencing matters. Therefore, the
Court ruled in Mitchell, the defendant's silence could not be used against her
to increase her sentence. In Gray v. Maryland9 and Lilly v. Virginia,'" two
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation cases, the Court also restricted the
1. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
2. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
3. 526 US. 559 (1999).
4. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
5. 526 U.s. 603 (1999).
6. 526 U.s. 808 (1999).
7. 524 U.s. 666 (1998).
8. 526 U.s. 314 (1999).
9. 523 U.s. 185 (1998).
10. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
440 [Vol. 36
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prosecution's use of confessions by non-testifying co-defendants, and in
Swidler & Berlin v. United States" held that the federal attorney client privi-
lege continued after the death of the client with respect to disclosure of in-
criminating matters. Yet, in Conn v. Gabbert2 the Court found that prosecu-
tors did not violate due process when they detained an attorney in the
courthouse in order to execute a search warrant for letters carried on his per-
son, even though the timing of the warrant's execution was deliberately cal-
culated to prevent the attorney from being available for consultation while
his client was called to testify before a grand jury.
In a number of other decisions the Court made it more difficult for con-
victed defendants to obtain reversal of their convictions. In O'Sullivan v.
Boerckel,3 the Court held that a habeas petitioner had not properly exhausted
his state remedies when he failed to seek discretionary review in the state's
highest court. In Strickler v. Greene4 the Court also affirmed defendant's
death penalty conviction even though the prosecution failed to disclose
documents to the defense which contained impeachment material discredit-
ing a key witness.
While it seems at times that the Court is giving with one hand while tak-
ing away with the other, what these decisions appear to demonstrate is the
Court's attempt to remove constitutional obstacles along the pathway toward
conviction of the guilty, without at the same time discarding wholesale the
constitutional restraints on state power that are designed to prevent abuses
and harassment of the innocent. This is seen most clearly in City of Chicago
v. Morales5 where the majority, while refusing to countenance a constitu-
tional right to loiter, nevertheless struck down Chicago's Gang Congregation
Ordinance on the ground that its broad and subjective definition of loitering
permitted arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement against non-gang mem-
bers.
Finally, in what may turn out to be the most important case during the
1998-99 Term, the Court in Saenz v. Roe 6 resurrected the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment after it had lain dormant for
130 years. While Saenz is a non-criminal case involving the right to travel,
the Court's willingness to utilize this separate provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment could have important implications for criminal law and proce-
dure in state cases. This is because any provision of the Bill of Rights guar-
anteed as a matter of due process could also arguably be considered a privi-
lege or immunity of national citizenship protected against abridgement by
the states.
11. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
12. 526 U.S. 286 (1999).
13. 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
14. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
15. 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
16. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
2000]
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II. ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
A. Standing
Minnesota v. Carter'
In what was the 1998-99 term's most revealing harbinger of future Fourth
Amendment issues, a fragmented court further reduced the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection by denying temporary business invitees the right to
challenge the warrantless search of their host's home." The decision high-
lights deep divisions among the Justices with respect to constitutional
protection for privacy and leaves in its wake an indeterminate multi-factor
test for deciding when a visitor's Fourth Amendment rights are violated by
government intrusions, which would violate the homeowner's rights. The
decision will result in increasing the admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and as Justice Ginsburg points out in
dissent, create incentives for police to make warrantless intrusions into
hom6after was arrested in a suburb of Minneapolis Minnesota and charged
with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The facts developed at a pre-trial hear-
ing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence disclose that one evening a
confidential informant told a police officer that he had looked into a ground
level window of a basement apartment and observed people at a table putting
white powder into bags." The informant had not previously been known to
the officer, nor was his reliability otherwise established. The officer went to
the apartment complex. Standing in the dark, about a foot outside the apart-
ment window, he peered into the apartment for fifteen minutes through a gap
in the venetian blinds, which had been drawn shut.' A light was on in the
apartment and the officer saw the female tenant and two visitors, Carter and
Johns, seated at a dining table. They were observed placing what appeared to
be cocaine in plastic baggiest' This observation was later used to justify
Carter's arrest and to obtain a search warrant to seize evidence in the apart-
ment.
Carter and Johns had come from Chicago. The record did not disclose
their relationship with the tenant other than the fact she received one eighth
of an ounce of cocaine in exchange for the use of her apartment as a work-
place to package the cocaine. The two visitors stayed in the apartment for
approximately two and one-half hours and were arrested immediately after
17. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
18. See id. at 83.
19. See generally id.
20. See id. at 95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
21. See id. at 88.
22. See id.
23. See id. at Joint Appendix F at 7-14.
[Vol. 36
6
California Western Law Review, Vol. 36 [1999], No. 2, Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss2/11
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT
they left it.' The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the officer's observa-
tion into the home constituted a warrantless search which Carter had "stand-
ing" to contest since he was an invited guest of the apartment's leaseholder.'
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing that Carter's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because he had
"no legitimate expectation of privacy" in the apartment which he had used
solely for a commercial purpose.26
Five justices joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Deciphering the ramifi-
cations of this decision, however, requires careful reading because two of the
justices in the majority (Scalia and Kennedy) also wrote concurring opinions
which are inconsistent with each other.27 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Stevens
and Souter, dissented.28 Justice Breyer, while expressing agreement with the
dissenters on the standing issue, nevertheless concurred in the judgment on
the separate ground that the officer's observation through the window did
not constitute a "search" triggering Fourth Amendment safeguards because
the officer made the observation from a public place used by the general
public. Breyer was the only justice to address this issue.29
The Chief Justice, assuming arguendo that the officer's observation was
a search with respect to the homeowner, began his opinion for the Court by
rebuking the Minnesota Supreme Court for employing the concept of "stand-
ing," noting that this form of analysis had been expressly rejected in Rakas
v. Illinois." In Rakas, the defendants were passengers in a car that was
stopped and searched, revealing a weapon under the front passenger seat and
shells in a locked glove compartment. The Court held that as mere passen-
gers, defendants' had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and
therefore had suffered no violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.3 Ra-
kas overturned the "legitimately on the premises" test established in Jones v.
United States,32 which gave anyone lawfully present in the place searched
standing to challenge the search if evidence derived from it was targeted
against them?3 Rakas held that the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures"' creates personal rights which
cannot be vicariously asserted.3' Therefore the issue in Carter is not whether
24. See id.
25. See id. at 89.
26. See id. at 91.
27. See generally id.
28. See id. at 105 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
30. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
31. See id.
32. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
33. See id.
34. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
35. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 128.
2000]
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Carter had "standing" to contest the violation of the homeowner's rights, but
rather, whether Carter had personally been subjected to a "search."36
In Katz v. United States 7 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion formu-
lated a two-pronged test that has now become the divining rod for determin-
ing when government conduct constitutes a search. A Fourth Amendment
"search" occurs when the government intrudes upon a person's (1) subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, and (2) society accepts that expectation of pri-
vacy as reasonable? Katz expanded the scope of constitutional protection
for privacy beyond the Amendment's literal text in order to include elec-
tronic eavesdropping within its compass, holding that a telephone conversa-
tion in a public phone booth was safeguarded from warrantless governmental
eavesdropping. In the hands of the Rehnquist Court, however, the test has
been used to restrict protection for privacy.39 In the context of the issue in
Carter, Chief Justice Rehnquist viewed the Katz "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test as a continuum.' At one end of the spectrum, he noted, is the
overnight guest. The Court ruled in Minnesota v. Olson4' that as a matter of
social custom a guest who spends the night has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her host's home.'2 At the other end is a person who is simply le-
gitimately on the premises. Without more, such a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy and therefore no Fourth Amendment protection. This
is because no "search" occurs with respect to that person and the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements therefore do not ap-
ply.
Finding that the defendant in Carter lay "somewhere in between" these
two extremes,43 the Chief Justice gave three reasons for concluding that
Carter's situation fell closer to the "no protection" end of the spectrum. First,
the home was used solely to package cocaine - a purely commercial pur-
pose. Thus Carter was merely a business invitee and the "home" was, with
respect to Carter, merely commercial premises in which there are signifi-
cantly diminished expectations of privacy." Second, the duration of the stay
was brief, only two and one-half hours. Finally, there was nothing in the re-
36. While the Chief Justice would therefore eschew the term "standing" altogether, his
approach obscures the fact that a constitutional violation has occurred with respect to some-
one. Despite the Chief Justice's view, the term was employed during the oral argument of the
case and by Justice Ginsburg in her dissent.
37. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in sealed trash bags left for the garbage collector); see generally Laure-
nce A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 825 (1989).
40. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 88.
41. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
42. See id.
43. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
44. See id. at 93 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)).
[Vol. 36
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cord to suggest a "previous connection" between Carter and the apartment's
leaseholder.45
It is tempting to view the majority opinion in Carter as a categorical
bright line rule, which would exclude all business invitees from Fourth
Amendment protection. Indeed, Justice O'Connor proposed such a categori-
cal approach during oral argument, suggesting that a line could be drawn be-
tween business visitors and social guests. However, as the hypotheticals ban-
tered about during oral argument quickly suggested, such a line would easily
become blurred and also produce unacceptable results. For example, is it
clear that a paid babysitter should be treated the same as the washing ma-
chine repair man? On which side of the line should one place a home health-
care nurse, or a co-worker who visits to jointly work on a job-related task
with the homeowner? Indeed, if the test simply focused on commercial pur-
pose, would not Katz himself be considered a mere business invitee when he
entered the phone booth and paid his dime to place the call regarding his
bookmaking business? In light of the frayed edges, which would quickly ap-
pear with such a monochromatic test, the majority therefore adopted a multi-
factored approach rather than a bright line rule.' How the Court in the future
will apply the nature of use, duration and relationship factors is clouded,
however, by the concurring opinions of Scalia and Kennedy.
Justice Kennedy joined the Chief Justice's opinion stating that it was
consistent with his view that as a general rule "almost all social guests" have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their host's home.47 Justice Kennedy
did not elaborate any criteria for distinguishing which social guests would
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Carter's "fleeting and insubstantial
connection" with the home simply did not give rise to "guest" status.' Jus-
tice Kennedy did give an indication as to what he thought were relevant con-
siderations, however, when he noted that there was no evidence Carter en-
gaged in confidential communications with the homeowner or had any
meaningful connection to her or the home. This comment suggests that Jus-
tice Kennedy, like the Court in Katz, would give careful consideration to the
nature of the activity intruded upon and not rely simply upon the status of
the individual or the fact that the Activity was conducted for a business pur-
pose.
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justice Thomas, also joined the
Chief Justice's opinion because " it accurately applies our recent case law.""
Although he apparently felt bound by that body of precedent, Justice Scalia,
nevertheless, did not agree with the reasoning of those cases. He rejected
outright the Katzian mode of analysis employed by both the dissent and the
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. See id. at 102.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 91.
2000]
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Chief Justice, calling it a "fuzzy," "self-indulgent" and "notoriously unhelp-
ful" standard which "bears an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of
privacy that this Court considers reasonable."'" Contrary to both the Chief
Justice and the rest of the Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas would thus
abandon the Katz test and apply the Fourth Amendment only as literally
written and historically understood. They would therefore refuse to allow
even a social guest to claim Fourth Amendment protection unless they use
the home as their residence. Presumably this requires sleeping overnight
since Olsen represents for Scalia the "absolute limit of what text and tradi-
tion permit" in extending Fourth Amendment protection.'
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented.' In
their view, any time a homeowner invites another to share the privacy of her
home, the guest gains a reasonable expectation of privacy regardless of the
duration of the stay or its purpose because such social interaction "serves
functions recognized as valuable by society."' Justice Ginsburg also voiced
concern that the majority's decision would tempt the police to make war-
rantless incursions into homes since they had everything to gain and little to
lose if they knew that a least one potential defendant was a non-resident
against whom any evidence obtained would be admissible.'
Justice Breyer's separate concurring opinion is by far the most disturb-
ing, if not the most puzzling. 6 Agreeing with the dissent that Carter could
claim Fourth Amendment protection with respect to a search of the apart-
ment, he nevertheless believed that Carter's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated because there had been no "unreasonable search" of that home.
The brief seven paragraph opinion consisting mostly of factual "assump-
tions," misperceives prior case law as "well-established" when it is not, and
appears to conflate two separate prongs of analysis: (1) whether there was a
search, and if so, (2) whether the search was "unreasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment.'
Justice Breyer cites Florida v. Riley,58 as authority for an apparently
simple rule that it is permissible for an officer to see what may be seen from
a lawful public vantage point. His pinpoint citation for this "well estab-
lished" rule, however, was to Justice White's plurality opinion which an-
nounced only the judgment in Riley and represented the views of only four
Justices: White, the Chief Justice, Kennedy and Scalia.9 Five justices, in
51. Id. at 91, 97.
52. Id. at 96.
53. See id. at 105 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 108.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
57. See id. at 104.
58. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
59. See id. at 447.
[Vol. 36
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fact, rejected that simple test.' Four dissenting justices (Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens and Blackmun) and Justice O'Connor, who concurred only in the
judgment on a separate ground involving the burden of proof, all agreed that
the fact the helicopter was in a lawful position was not determinative.6 In
her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the four dissenting
justices that the test was not whether the officer made his observation from a
vantage point the public could lawfully use. Rather, the proper test was
whether the public used that vantage point with "sufficient regularity" so
that the citizen's expectation of privacy was unreasonable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in a thoughtful and well reasoned opin-
ion by Justice Tomljanovich, found that the officer had taken "extraordinpry
measures" to enable him to view the inside of the apartment because he left
the sidewalk, climbed over some bushes and crouched down, placing his
face within twelve to eighteen inches from the window pane in order to see
through a small gap in the blinds which had been shut. The members of the
Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously agreed that under these circum-
stances the homeowner had not knowingly exposed the inside of her apart-
ment to observation by members of the general public. Therefore the offi-
cer's observation invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy and
constituted a search." Since the prosecution conceded that there was neither
probable cause nor a warrant authorizing the intrusion, the state court held it
was an "unreasonable" search, which violated the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Breyer took issue with the Minnesota Supreme Court's conclu-
sion that the officer had engaged in contortions in order to view the inside of
the apartment.' Admittedly, the officer never testified that he climbed over
bushes or crouched. It also appears from photographic exhibits that the
apartment windows were standard size. It would therefore appear possible to
see into the apartment while simply standing and looking downward if the
blinds were open. But the blinds were closed and it would seem a reasonable
inference that during the officer's fifteen minute observation he must have
positioned himself in ways members of the public passing by would not, in
order to see through the gap in the blinds. Justice Breyer, however, asserted
that the record denied such an inference.' Rejecting the judgment of a
unanimous Minnesota Supreme Court, Justice Breyer chose to make the op-
60. See generally id. (involving surveillence of defendant's curtilage from a helicopter
lawfully in public airspace).
61. For a detailed discussion of Riley and the two conflicting views expressed in that
case, see Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court,
22 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 825, 861-73. For a case making a valiant attempt to apply Riley see
Pew v. Scorpio, 904 F. Supp. 18 (1995) (complaining about the "unhappy state of Supreme
Court precedent").
62. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 454; see also Benner, supra note 61 at 863.
63. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W. 2d 169, 177-78 (1997).
64. See id.
65. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66. See id.
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posite inference and assumed that any member of the public could have seen
the same thing the officer saw. 7 This assumption was based upon limited
testimony of a police officer that families in the apartment complex used the
grassy common area for playing and walking and a prosecution photograph,
which conveniently showed a bicycle leaning against the wall right next to
the apartment window in question.' Drawing the inference against the de-
fendant seems somewhat unfair, however, in light of the officer's convenient
memory loss when asked to describe the location of the gap in the blinds
through which he claimed to have viewed the inside of the apartment. Dur-
ing the officer's direct testimony at the suppression hearing the following
testimony was elicited by leading questions from the prosecutor:
Q. Finally officer, I'm showing you Exhibit 17, which I believe we can
stipulate to is a picture of the same window... As far as the size, the
width of the blind and everything else, does it appear to be the same?
A. As far as I recall right now, yes.
Q. The only difference is they were open, at least one or two of them were
open .... Do you recall which ones were open at all?
A. I-I know we got a lot of pictures. I don't recall right offhand which
portion of the blind was open that I could see through.
Obviously the location of the opening was an important fact. If the gap
was in the lower portion of the window, the angle of observation from a
standing position would not have permitted the officer to see into the interior
of the apartment as he claimed, unless he crouched down. Although the bur-
den of establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy is on the defendant,"
we deal here with the question of when inferences of fact will be permitted
to establish that burden. Because the officer failed to testify as to even the
general location of the gap, it would seem fairness would require that any
inference be drawn against the state regarding its location. If that is done,
then it necessarily follows that the officer could not have seen into the win-
dow from a vantage point ordinarily used by members of the public who
presumably pass by windows standing upright.
The most disturbing part of Justice Breyer's opinion, however, is not in
his debatable factual assumptions, but rather his concluding observation that
there was a "benefit" to permitting a police officer, from a "public vantage
point" to confirm an untested informant's tip by peeping into a woman's
apartment window through closed blinds at night. The asserted benefit was
that the officer's tom-peeping would have saved an innocent apartment
dweller from a more physically intrusive search if the observation had re-
vealed no illegal activity. But surely that does not follow. If the officer does
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at Joint Appendix F, 31-32.
70. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
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not have probable cause because the informant is not reliable, then he should
not be able to get a search warrant to conduct the physically intrusive search.
As Professor Amsterdam has observed:
[U]nless the Fourth Amendment controls tom-peeping and subjects it to a
requirement of [probable] cause.. .police may look through windows and
observe a thousand innocent acts for every guilty act they spy out. Should
we say that prospect is not alarming because the innocent homeowner
need not fear that he will get caught doing anything wrong? The Fourth
Amendment protects not only against incrimination, but against invasions
of privacy -or rather, as Katz holds, of the right to maintain privacy with-
out giving up too much freedom as the cost of privacy. The question is not
whether you or I must draw the blinds before we commit a crime. It is
whether you and I must discipline ourselves to draw the blinds every time
we enter a room, under pain of surveillance if we do not.7
Under Justice Breyer's logic, a citizen must live under pain of surveil-
lance even if they draw their blinds! Perhaps that is why the other members
of the Court did not leap into this briar patch where the privacy of citizens
without the financial means to live in single family residences behind gated
walls can be so easily balanced away. The Minnesota Supreme Court, as-
suning that the untested informant's tip established at least reasonable sus-
picion, rejected the argument that "a little bit of information justifies a little
bit of search."' It is not clear, however, that Justice Breyer would require
even this minimal level of protection since he did not distinguish between a
known and an anonymous informant. Surely, in light of the Court's recent
unanimous decision in Florida v. J.L.,"3 Justice Breyer would agree that if
police cannot conduct a minimally intrusive pat down search of a person for
weapons based solely upon an anonymous informant's tip, they likewise
cannot conduct a minimally intrusive search of a home.
What is most distressing about the Carter decision, however, is the re-
alization that it appears possible that five members of the Court could adopt
Justice White's simple "lawful public vantage point" test as the only control
on police snooping." Under this test, if the officer is standing in a public
place where any member of the general public could in theory lawfully
stand, then whatever the officer can see from that vantage point is fair game.
71. Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349,
402-03 (1974).
72. State v Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Minn. 1997). Arguably the informant's tip in
Carter created reasonable suspicion since the informant was known to the officer. See Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (holding that where the informant is known to the officer
there is an indicia of reliability sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion because the in-
formant can be held accountable if his information turns out to be a fabrication).
73. 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000).
74. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined White's plurality
opinion in Riley. Justice Breyer would make four. Justice Thomas, who generally follows
Scalia in Fourth Amendment matters would be a likely fifth vote.
20001
13
Benner et al.: Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
This simple test admittedly has the attraction of providing a bright line for
police to follow. However, the "lawful public vantage point" test's simplic-
ity is deceptive because it obscures the far reaching consequences it would
have in diminishing the privacy all citizens may enjoy in their own homes. It
would also signal the deathnell for Katz and the reasonable expectation of
privacy test."
B. Automobile Searches
Florida v. White 6
Over dissents by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, the Supreme Court re-
versed the Florida Supreme Court and upheld the warrantless seizure of an
automobile parked in a public place.' The sole basis for the seizure was
probable cause to believe the car was subject to forfeiture.78
Florida's Contraband Forfeiture Act provides that an automobile used in
connection with an illegal drug transaction is subject to forfeiture. Defendant
White was observed using his car to transport cocaine." Several months later
White was arrested at his place of work on an unrelated charge.' His car,
which was parked in his employer's parking lot was seized at the time of his
arrest on the sole ground it was "forfeitable contraband" because of the prior
drug transportation. An inventory search of the car revealed two pieces of
crack cocaine in the ashtray.8'
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that no exigency justified the seizure
of the vehicle without a warrant and suppressed the fruits of the inventory
search.' Distinguishing Carroll v. United States,3 the Florida high court
concluded that there was a "vast difference" between a temporary seizure
and search of a car under Carroll and the more intrusive seizure of a vehicle
for the purpose of forfeiture."
Justice Thomas, writing for seven members of the Court disagreed, find-
ing that the "principles underlying the rule in Carroll... fully support the
conclusion that the warrantless seizure of respondent's car did not violate the
Fourth Amendment."85 To bolster this conclusion, Thomas argued that fed-
75. For a discussion of alternative approaches to the "lawful public vantage point" test,
see Benner, supra note 61 at 868-73.
76. 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 561.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 562.
82. White v Florida, 710 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1998)
83. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (the prohibition era case which created the automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement for searches of readily mobile vehicles).
84. White, 710 So.2d at 953.
85. Id.
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eral law enforcement practice at the time the Fourth Amendment was
adopted permitted such warrantless seizures, and cited ancient customs stat-
utes dating back to 1789 to support this contention. 6 These statutes author-
ized warrantless searches and seizures of ships, which concealed goods sub-
ject to customs duties." Thomas also emphasized that the car was parked in a
public place and that therefore no privacy interest was involved which mer-
ited protection by a warrant.8
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg dissented. They noted that
while the majority had not disavowed the presumption that a warrantless sei-
zure is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the exceptions have all
but swallowed this general rule." Indeed there would no longer seem to be
any presumption with respect to automobiles, for it is hard to see how the
balancing test normally used to overcome the presumption in favor of war-
rants could have been fairly applied in this case. On the state's side of the
scale there was no fear that anything dangerous or illegal was inside the car
at the time it was seized. The only state concern was an economic interest in
the forfeited vehicle which at most was threatened by the theoretical exi-
gency that the movable vehicle, which the police had impounded, might
somehow escape from police control before they could get a warrant,
notwithstanding the fact that the police held both the keys and the owner in
custody.9' On the other side of the balance was the owner's significant prop-
erty interest affected by a lengthy seizure, the privacy interest invaded by the
inevitable inventory search of the vehicle, and the time, expense and hassle
of having to litigate to reclaim wrongfully seized property in a post-
deprivation hearing.92 As the dissent pointed out, the protection which a war-
rant provides - a neutral determination of probable cause - was especially
needed in this case to protect those interests because law enforcement agen-
cies cannot be relied upon to be impartial decision makers, since they have a
pecuniary interest in the property they seize for the purpose of forfeiture.93
A final observation concerns the telltale warning signaled by Justices
Souter and Breyer." Although they joined Thomas' opinion, they neverthe-
less cautioned in a separate concurring opinion by Justice Souter that the ma-
jority opinion should not be read "as a general endorsement of warrantless
seizures of anything a State chooses to call 'contraband' whether or not the
property happens to be in public when seized."95 This warning highlights the
86. See id. at 562.
87. See id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1925)).
88. See id. at 561.
89. See id. at 564 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 565.
91. See id. at 564.
92. See generally id.
93. See id. at 570. Under Florida law title to the forfeited property vests in the seizing
law enforcement agency. Fla. Stat. § 932.704(8).
94. See id. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring).
95. Id.
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curious fact that the state did not argue the warrantless seizure was justified
under the plain view doctrine. 6 Instead of relying on this doctrine the state
sought a decision on a far more sweeping question: "[W]hether, absent exi-
gent circumstances, the warrantless seizure of an automobile under the [Con-
traband] Forfeiture Act violated the Fourth Amendment."" Thomas's opin-
ion does not state the question to be answered in this broad way. Indeed, he
pays lip service to the fact that the automobile in this case was in a public
place, but it is not clear that the locus of the car is essential to the majority's
holding. Especially in light of Thomas' assertion that Carroll and historical
practice "fully support" the majority's conclusion that the warrantless sei-
zure was valid,98 we may well expect someday to see the argument, Souter
and Breyer's disclaimer notwithstanding, that property which is not illegally
possessed, and is not evidence of a crime, may nevertheless be seized with-
out a warrant if there is probable cause to believe it may be forfeitable under
some statutory definition of "contraband." In light of the weak protection af-
forded by the Fourth Amendment's balancing test, it may be that only post-
deprivation remedies guaranteed under procedural due process will provide
any meaningful protection against unwarranted seizures of property in the
future."
Wyoming v. Houghton"'
In Katz v. United States,"0 ' the Supreme Court established the guiding
principle that the Fourth Amendment protects people not places."4 In Hough-
ton, a divided Court tossed this principle aside, reduced the privacy of auto-
mobile passengers and expanded the scope of an automobile search, holding
that where police have probable cause to search a car, they may search a
passenger's belongings if they could contain the object of the search. 3 Spe-
cifically, the majority found that probable cause to search a driver's car for
drugs based on the driver's conduct and admissions, justified the search of a
female passenger's purse, even though there was no probable cause to sus-
pect her of wrongdoing or to believe there was contraband in her purse. 4 In
dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Souter and Ginsburg accused the Court of
going beyond existing precedent and overturning the "settled distinction" be-
tween drivers and passengers recognized over fifty years ago by Justice
96. The plain view doctrine permits police to make warrantless seizures if they are in a
lawful position to view and seize the property and have probable cause to believe it is contra-
band or evidence of a crime. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
97. White, 526 U.S. at 559.
98. See id. at 564.
99. See generally City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999).
100. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
101. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
102. See id. at 353.
103. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 296.
104. See id.
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Jackson in United States v. Di Re. 5 The search in Houghton arose following
a routine traffic stop for speeding. A Wyoming Highway Patrol officer no-
ticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver's shirt pocket.' 7 The driver admitted
that he used the syringe to take drugs.' 3 At this point the officer ordered two
female passengers out of the car. One of those females was Sandra Hough-
ton.'" Searching the car he found a purse on the back seat, which Houghton
admitted belonged to her."' Inside the purse the officer found several con-
tainers which he also opened, discovering drugs."'
In an apparent attempt to cut the Gordian Knot of confusion surround-
ing the scope of automobile searches based on probable cause, the Court in
Houghton abandoned the individualized suspicion standard in order to fash-
ion a bright line rule."' After Houghton, an officer who has probable cause
to search an automobile can search any container capable of holding the ob-
ject of the search. This will be true even though the container is identified as
the property belonging to a mere passenger, and even though there is no
probable cause to believe that specific container holds the object of the
search.
In an extraordinarily cavalier opinion, Justice Scalia begins with his tra-
ditional two step analysis of Fourth Amendment issues."3 First, Scalia looks
at history to provide an answer to the question whether the search or seizure
is reasonable."" If history is unavailing, he then turns to a balancing test
where he measures "the degree to which the search intrudes upon an indi-
vidual' s privacy" and balances that against "the degree to which [the search]
is needed for the promotion of legitimate government interests.""
Turning to history, Scalia finds that there is historical support for per-
mitting the search of all containers in a vehicle. As precedent he dredges up
from the obscurity of antiquity old customs cases involving searches of ships
for imported goods."6
Recognizing that these cases don't quite deal with something as private
as a woman's purse, he then moved on to conduct his balancing test. Here,
he employed a bizarre "assumption of the slightest theoretical risk dimin-
ishes your privacy" argument, finding that a passenger's expectation of pri-
vacy in personal belongings carried in a car are diminished because the car
105. See id. at 303 (citing United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
106. See id. at 302.
107. See id. at 299.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 301.
113. See id. at 298.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id.
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might become involved in a traffic accident where the contents might be
scattered about, and thus be open to public scrutiny."7
Placing his thumb on the scale for the government, Scalia then con-
cluded that catching drug users would be "appreciably impaired" by a rule
that required officers to refrain from searching passengers belongings unless
they have probable cause, because the passengers might be involved with the
driver in illegal drug use."' Acknowledging that it would not always be true
that passengers would be partners in crime with drivers, Scalia nevertheless
asserted: "but the balancing of interests must be conducted with an eye to the
generality of cases.""9 To require individualized justification for the search
of a passenger's belongings would result in a "bog of litigation" Scalia ob-
served, which would muddy the bright line rule."2 Therefore, the balance of
interests militated in favor of the "needs of law enforcement" and against a
personal privacy interest which Scalia viewed as "ordinarily weak."' 2'
Justice Breyer in a concurring opinion agreed that creating a passenger's
belongings exception would muddy the bright line rule that allowed the
search of all containers which could hold the object of the search.'" He
noted, however, several limitations on the holding of Houghton. First, he
observed that the bright line rule only applied to automobile searches. 23 Sec-
ond, he noted that Houghton does not authorize personal searches without
probable cause or reasonable fear for safety (pat downs)." Finally, Breyer
took pains to point out, in Houghton the woman was not holding her purse. It
"would matter" to Justice Breyer "if a woman's purse, like a man's billfold,
were attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of outer cloth-
ing."'" So much for bright line rules.
By focusing on the places searched, (i.e. the automobile and the purse,
the court has, in a futile quest for simplistic clarity, stood Katz 260n its head
and once again forsaken the principle of individualized justification, which
once served as the cornerstone of fourth amendment protection.' 27
117. Id. at300.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 301.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 302 (stating that "the resulting uncertainty will destroy the workability of
the bright line rule set forth in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)").
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
127. See generally, Benner, supra note 61.
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Knowles v. Iowa2'
In an apparent victory for the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
held the line and refused to expand the search incident to arrest exception
beyond circumstances involving an actual custodial arrest.'29
Knowles was stopped for speeding forty-three m.p.h. in a twenty-five
m.p.h. zone.' Under Iowa law, the officer had the discretion to make either
a custodial arrest or issue a citation. 3' Regardless of which option he chose,
the officer was authorized by statute to make a full search of the car during a
traffic stop. The officer gave Knowles a citation and then searched his car
without consent or probable cause, finding marijuana under the seat.'32
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed the Iowa Supreme Court's decision, which had upheld
the search incident to a citation.' As the Chief Justice noted, the rationale
for the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is based
upon "(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody,
and (2) the need to preserve evidence .... ."" Limiting the search incident to
arrest to its rationale, Rehnquist concluded that only when a person is ar-
rested and taken into custody, do the concerns for officer safety justify the
full search of the person and automobile.' The danger to the officer flows
from the fact of arrest, which results in extended exposure to the suspect un-
der circumstances of stress and uncertainty. On the other hand, a routine traf-
fic arrest resulting in a citation was viewed by the Chief Justice as "more
analogous to a so-called Terry stop."'36 Such a "brief encounter" was less
likely to provoke hostility to police. In any event, noted the Chief Justice,
officers have an independent basis to search for weapons and protect them-
selves from danger. They can order the driver and any passengers out of the
car.'37 They can also conduct a Terry pat down of both driver and passenger
if there is reasonable suspicion they may be "armed and dangerous."'3 Po-
lice may also conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the car if
there is "reasonable suspicion an occupant is dangerous and may gain im-
mediate control of a weapon. '39
Rejecting Iowa's "bright line rule" that full searches of cars were per-
128 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
129. See generally id.
130. See id. at 117.
131. See id. at 18, n.1.
132. See id. at 117.
133. See id.
134. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)).
135. See id. at 120.
136. Id.
137. See id. (citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997); Pennsylvania v.
Minms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)).
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mitted in any case in which there was probable cause to make a custodial ar-
rest, the Chief Justice concluded that the concern for officer safety "is not
present to the same extent (in a routine traffic stop) and the concern for de-
struction or loss of evidence is not present at all."'"
C. Media Presence During Searches
Wilson v. Layne""
Pursuant to a U.S. Marshals' national fugitive apprehension program,
three arrest warrants for probation violations were obtained for Dominic
Wilson." Each warrant bore the address of Dominic's parents' home, al-
though the police were unaware of this fact. Around 6:45 a.m., a team of
U.S. Marshals and Montgomery County police, accompanied by a reporter
and a photographer from the Washington Post, entered the Wilson resi-
dence.' Dominic Wilson's parents, Charles and Geraldine, were still in bed
when the officers entered. Charles, dressed only in briefs, ran into the living
room to investigate.'" He found at least five plain-clothes men with guns in
his living room, so he angrily demanded that they state their business. The
officers quickly subdued Charles while his wife, dressed only in a night-
gown, watched. Dominic was not in the house. The Post photographers
took numerous pictures, which were never published.'"
The petitioners sued the law enforcement officials in their personal ca-
pacities as they contended that the officers' actions in bringing members of
the media into their home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The
District Court denied respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ba-
sis of qualified immunity." A divided Court of Appeals panel reversed and
held that the respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. 49
The Supreme Court granted review to reconcile a split among the Cir-
cuits.' The Court began by noting that government officials performing dis-
cretionary functions generally were granted a qualified immunity and were
"shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct did not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, which a reason-
able person would have known."''
140. Id.
141. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
142. See id. at 606.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 607.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
[Vol. 36
20
California Western Law Review, Vol. 36 [1999], No. 2, Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss2/11
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT
The officers, without question, had authority to enter the Wilson home
to execute the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson. However, police actions in
execution of a warrant must be related to the objectives of the authorized in-
trusion of the home. The Court found that the presence of the media was
clearly unrelated to the objective of effecting an arrest."
In answering Respondent's First Amendment arguments, the Court also
found that the interest of the police and U.S. Marshals in promoting good
public relations was simply not enough, standing alone, to justify the media
intrusion into a private home.'
The Court concluded, however, that it was not unreasonable for a police
officer to have believed that bringing media observers along during the exe-
cution of an arrest warrant in a home was lawful. Therefore, qualified im-
munity applied in this case."M In his dissent Justice Stevens did not believe
that qualified immunity applies when the sanctity of the home has been in-
vaded.'55
Hanlon v. Berger 6
In this companion case to Wilson v. Layne'", government officials in
multiple vehicles went onto a ranch to execute a search warrant, for "the tak-
ing of wildlife in violation of federal laws."'' The warrant excluded the resi-
dence on the 75,000-acre ranch. The officials brought a media crew from
CNN with them and searched the ranch and its outbuildings.'59 In a per cu-
riam opinion the Court again found a Fourth Amendment violation, but ruled
that the police and U.S. Marshals had qualified immunity, because this was a
case of first impression."6 Justice Stevens reiterated his dissent in Wilson.6"
D. Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott62
In Scott, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
does not extend to parole revocation hearings. Scott was on parole for a
152. See id. at 609.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 611.
155. See id. at 615 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
156. 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
157. See Wilson, 526 U.S. 603.
158. Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 808.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 809 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
163. See id. at 359. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally
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third degree murder conviction.6 As a consideration for release on parole,
he signed an agreement that gave permission for authorities to conduct war-
rantless searches of his residence." When police officers received informa-
tion that Scott possessed firearms, among other things, at his home, they ob-
tained an arrest warrant for him and arrested Scott at a restaurant.'" They
also went to his home, however, and conducted a warrantless search, seizing
evidence that was introduced against Scott at his parole revocation hearing. 7
Scott was held to be in violation of his parole and returned to the peniten-
tiary to serve at least 36 months of "backtime."'' 8 No other criminal proceed-
ings were brought against Scott. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court con-
cluded that the evidence should have been suppressed as unlawfully seized
since the arresting officers knew Scott was on parole when they arrested
him.'69 The Pennsylvania court had analyzed the issue as one of balancing
the cost to society of excluding probative evidence against the benefits to be
derived from deterring Fourth Amendment violations. 7 ' The state court con-
cluded that a failure to exclude the unlawfully seized evidence would en-
courage officers to violate the Fourth Amendment right of all parolees. In-
deed, the violations would be rewarded by the return of the parolee to prison,
perhaps for a considerably lengthier period of incarceration than if the pa-
rolee were prosecuted for the offense arising from the discovered evidence.
Justice Thomas, writing for a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, re-
versed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, holding the unlawfully seized evi-
dence was admissible.' The majority in the U.S. Supreme Court saw the
balance differently. Justice Thomas reasoned that burdening the administra-
tive process of the penitentiary system with challenges to the method em-
ployed by the state in securing the evidence would have too deleterious an
impact on prison administration.74 On the other hand, the Justices reasoned,
police do not make a conscious decision that evidence they secure should be
used for parole violation hearings rather than on original criminal prosecu-
tions. Original criminal prosecutions are the primary objectives of the po-
lice. "'75 Therefore, to exclude illegally obtained evidence in parole violation
proceedings exacted too great a price when compared to what Justice Tho-
inadmissible at trial in a criminal case. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.643 (1961). There are numer-
ous exceptions, however. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
164. See id. at 360.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at361.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 369.
172. See id. at 361.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 364.
175. See id. at 367.
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mas saw to be a relatively negligible benefit. Justice Souter, joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented.'76 Justice Souter agreed that the exclu-
sionary rule is not required by the Fourth Amendment, but is a procedure to
deter Fourth Amendment violations by police. However, Justice Souter
found that a considerably greater benefit was achieved by utilizing the rule
in situations such as that presented by Scott, because parole revocation often
is the only forum in which the state will use the illegally seized evidence. "7
When a suspect is identified as a parolee, the police and parole officers usu-
ally cooperate. Hence, a parole revocation must be in the mind of the officer
as the investigation progresses. The result is usually a return to the peniten-
tiary for the parolee following an administrative hearing considerably less
cumbersome than a criminal trial, without the burdensome safeguards of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, evidentiary rules, or trial by jury. Thus,
when the subject of the police investigation is a known parolee, the incentive
to circumvent the Constitution becomes compelling.
Justice Stevens also wrote a short dissent in which he agreed with Jus-
tice Souter that exclusion should be available to parolees.' He added, how-
ever, that the exclusionary rule was not merely a creature of policy consid-
erations, since he believed exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the
Fourth Amendment was constitutionally mandated.'79
Iml. DUE PROCESS
A. Vagueness Doctrine
City of Chicago v. MoralesSO
A sharply divided Court struck down Chicago's Gang Congregation
Ordinance, which prohibited citizens who associated with apparent gang
members from loitering in a public place. 8' Designed to take back the streets
from gangs who intimidated the neighborhood, the ordinance allowed a po-
lice officer to order any group of two or more persons gathered in a public
place to disperse from the area if he reasonably believed one of them was a
gang member and determined they were loitering." Failure to obey the dis-
persal order gave the officer grounds to arrest all members of the group
whether or not they were gang members. 3
176. See id. at 370 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 377.
178. See id. at 369 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See id. (It is noteworthy that no court, including the U.S. Supreme Court, relied on
Scott's written agreement to allow warrantless searches of his home to justify the search).
180. 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
181. See id. at 1849.
182. See id. at 1851.
183. See id.
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Invoking the vagueness doctrine, a majority of six justices agreed the
ordinance was invalid because it unnecessarily gave police too much discre-
tion to determine what activities constituted "loitering" and therefore permit-
ted arbitrary enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause."u
Under the two alternate prongs of the vagueness doctrine, a law violates
the Due Process Clause if it either (1) fails to define the offense with suffi-
cient clarity to give fair warning regarding what conduct is prohibited, or, (2)
fails to provide sufficient guidelines to control official discretion in order to
prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. The Supreme Court has in
recent years found the second prong to be the more important.'85
The fatal flaw in the Chicago ordinance was the operative word "loiter-
ing," which was defined as remaining in one place "with no apparent pur-
pose."' 6 Finding that this inherently subjective definition gave police "vast
discretion" to determine when a group could be told to disperse, Justice Ste-
vens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer,
noted that relatives, teachers and even total strangers might arbitrarily have
their liberty abridged if they were seen talking to a gang member on a street
comer outside their own home. " On the other hand, the ordinance ironically
did not apply to situations where a group had an "apparent purpose" to
threaten or intimidate others.'88 Thus, the ordinance excluded from its broad
sweep the very conduct that supposedly motivated its enactment. Finding
that the broad grant of discretion failed to provide minimal standards of
definiteness and clarity to prevent abuses in enforcement, the majority there-
fore struck the ordinance down on its face without regard to the facts of the
cases consolidated for review.'89
Justice Scalia dissented separately"9 and Justice Thomas, joined by the
Chief Justice and Scalia also filed a brief dissenting opinion. 9' Admitting
that there might be "some ambiguity at the margin" Justice Scalia criticized
the majority's use of facial review to strike down the ordinance." Reciting
the facts of the specific encounters at issue on appeal, Justice Scalia would
have upheld the ordinance as applied to each of those cases. Justice Thomas,
in a brief paragraph complained that the majority had created a new freedom
to loiter, which was contrary to the Nation's history and tradition.93 How-
184. See id. at 1852.
185. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (striking down a California statute
which permitted arrest if a person failed to carry "credible and reliable" identification").
186. Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1852.
187. See id. at 1862.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1863.
190. See id. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
192. See id. at 1867 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ever, only two justices, Souter and Ginsburg joined that portion of Stevens'
opinion which referred to the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes as a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Breyer all filed separate concurring opinions, joining Steven's
opinion only in its central holding, which focused on the control of police
discretion.
It is clear from the six separate opinions in this case that a majority of
the Court is still committed to using facial review to strike down broad
sweeping laws which unnecessarily grant police such unbridled discretion
that they permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement practices."
Morales therefore is an important case because it establishes the Vagueness
Doctrine as an alternate approach to the Equal Protection Clause, when seek-
ing to combat racial discrimination in law enforcement. Under this alterna-
tive, laws which permit such discrimination can be invalidated without hav-
ing to prove racial bias.
B. Right to Practice Law
Conn v. Gabbe' 9
In a case involving the re-trial of the high profile "Menendez Brothers"
case, prosecutors learned that Lyle Menendez may have written a letter to
his former girlfriend instructing her to testify falsely at the first trial. 6 At-
torney Gabbert represented the girlfriend, Tracy Baker, who had testified for
the defense in the first trial, which ended in a hung jury. Prosecutors ob-
tained a subpoena directing the girlfriend to testify before the Los Angeles
County grand jury and to also produce any correspondence she may have re-
ceived from Lyle Menendez."l Prosecutors subsequently learned that Ms.
Baker had given all of her letters from Menendez to her attorney Mr. Gab-
bert. When Ms. Baker and Gabbert arrived at the courthouse on the day
scheduled for her grand jury testimony, prosecutors served a search warrant
for Gabbert's person, believing he would have the letter in his possession.'
While Gabbert was taken to a private room to be searched by a Special Mas-
ter, Ms. Baker was called by prosecutors into the grand jury room and ques-
tioned.'
Gabbert subsequently filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profession had
been unreasonably interfered with by the prosecutor's execution of a search
warrant at the precise moment his client was called to testify before the
194. See generally id.
195. 526 U.S. 286 (1999).
196. See id. at 289.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 290.
199. See id.
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grand jury.2" Justice Rehnquist, writing for eight members of the Court re-
jected this argument, finding that precedent established a violation only
when there was a complete prohibition of the right to engage in a calling."'
The brief interruption caused by legal process in this case, the Court said,
did not deprive Gabbert of any liberty interest in practicing law. Neither did
Gabbert have standing to raise any claim by his client that her right to the as-
sistance of counsel was violated, if indeed there was a right to have coun-
sel's assistance outside the grand jury room."
In conclusion, Rehnquist summarized the Court's holding by stating that
the Fourteenth Amendment right to practice one's calling is not violated by
the execution of a search warrant even if the timing of the search is "calcu-
lated to annoy or even to prevent consultation with a grand jury witness."2 3
Stevens, in a separate opinion concurred in the result because Gabbert
had not shown any evidence that his reputation, income, clientele or profes-
sional qualifications were adversely affected by the search.2" 4 Therefore, Ste-
vens could find no deprivation of any liberty or property interest. Stevens
noted that the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment had
not been squarely presented or argued by the parties.'
C. Procedural Due Process and Remedies for Wrongful Seizures
City of West Covina v. Perkins"
In an opinion joined by seven members of the Court, Justice Kennedy
concluded that due process requires law enforcement agents to take "reason-
able steps" to give notice to a homeowner that property has been seized pur-
suant to a search warrant.' 7 The majority did not go the extra step, however,
and require that police also give the homeowner notice of state law remedies
for obtaining the return of his or her property.2"'
Perkins had the bad luck to have a boarder who, later, after he left Per-
kins' home, became a suspect in a murder investigation." Police obtained a
search warrant for Perkins home to look for evidence against the former
boarder."' They seized a shotgun and other miscellaneous items belonging to
Perkins and his family including over $2000 in cash.2"' The officer left on the
200. See id.
201. See id. at 294.
202. See id. at 293.
203. Id. at 294.
204. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
205. See id. at 295.
206. 525 U.S. 234 (1999).
207. See id. at 234.
208. See generally id.
209. See id. at 235.
210. See id.
211. See id.
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premises an inventory of the items seized and the phone number of the de-
tective in charge of the investigation.2"2
When Perkins called the detective seeking return of his property, he was
told he needed to obtain a court order from the judge who issued the search
warrant. When Perkins went to the courthouse he discovered that the issuing
judge had gone on vacation."3 Perkins tried to get another judge to release
his property but was told that there was no record of any search warrant un-
der Perkin's name. The number of the search warrant had not been given in
the original notice and inventory because the search warrant had been sealed
to allegedly avoid compromising the ongoing murder investigation.2"4
Understandably upset at this apparent Catch-22, Perkins brought suit in
Federal District Court against the city alleging that the search had been con-
ducted without probable cause, had exceeded the scope of the warrant, and
that the city had a policy of permitting unlawful searches."5 The District
Court granted summary judgment for the city on these issues and it was sub-
sequently not contested that although Perkins was entitled to the return of his
property, a valid search warrant had been properly executed.2"6
The District Court also found that California's post deprivation reme-
dies for the return of seized property satisfied due process.2"7 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that while state law post deprivation remedies were ade-
quate, the city should have given Perkins notice of the proper procedure for
obtaining the return of his property and the information necessary to invoke
those procedures (i.e. the search warrant number).2"8
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that since adequate
state law remedies were published in generally available state statutes and
case law, a homeowner whose property had been seized could turn to "these
public sources to learn about the remedial procedures available to him.'2 9
The city therefore did not have to "inform him of his options.""0 In an ap-
parent attempt to assist such homeowners the Court attached an appendix to
the opinion listing the "Federal and State Laws Governing Execution of
Search Warrants and Procedures for Return of Seized Property. '22, Unfortu-
nately, the Appendix gives the wrong statutory reference for California - the
state which it presumably found had adequate procedures.
22
212. See id. at 235-36.
213. See id. at 236.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Perkins v. City of West Covina, 113 F.3d 1004, 1011-14 (91h Cir. 1997).
219. Id. at 237.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 239.
222. The Court's appendix cites CAL PENAL CODE §1535 which simply requires that the
officer executing a search warrant give a receipt for the property taken. The appropriate re-
medial sections, however, are §§ 1536 and 1540 which have been interpreted to empower a
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There is perhaps a brighter side to this case, however. The majority
opinion clearly and unequivocally asserts that when officers seize property
pursuant to a warrant "due process requires them to take reasonable steps to
give notice that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue avail-
able remedies for its return."' While the Court did not have occasion to de-
fine what "reasonable steps" might entail, it seems clear that at a minimum
such notice must describe the property that has been seized and identify the
agency responsible for the seizure. On this point there seems unanimous
agreement. Even Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Scalia, grudgingly acknowledged that history supported such a minimal no-
tice requirement.3' Thomas refused, however, to accept the majority's posi-
tion that such notice was required as a matter of procedural due process.'
Arguing that procedural due process should not apply to the execution of
search warrants, Thomas and Scalia would determine the scope of any notice
requirement under the Fourth Amendment's flexible reasonableness stan-
dard. 6 The Fourth Amendment, of course, is made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Since Due Proc-
ess is the engine that carries the Fourth Amendment to the states, Thomas
and Scalia would seem to have put the cart before the horse.
IV. SELF-INCRIMINATION
Mitchell v. United States22
In a narrow victory for the Fifth Amendment, the Court held firm to es-
tablished principles ruling 5-4 that a guilty plea does not constitute a waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination at sentencing. 8 Therefore, the
sentencing judge cannot draw an adverse inference based upon defendant's
silence regarding her participation in the crime."
Amanda Mitchell was among twenty-two defendants indicted for con-
spiracy to distribute cocaine. She pled guilty to the sheet without any plea
court to entertain summary proceedings and grant relief pursuant to a motion to return wrong-
fully seized property. See the lower court's opinion in Perkins, supra note 218, at 1011. How-
ever, neither § 1536 nor § 1540 describe the procedure for obtaining such a court order. In
light of the fact that search warrants most frequently target minorities who are less likely to
have adequate access to legal resources, one may question the Court's assumption that these
"public resources" are very helpful. See Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Search-
ingfor Narcotics in San Diego, 36 CAL. W. L. REv. 221,230 (2000).
223. Id. at 240.
224. Id at 247.
225. See id. at 246 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Thomas' view the majority's "sugges-
tion" was dicta. See id.
226. See id.
227. 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
228. See id.
229. See id.
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agreement, but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributed to
her at sentencing. At the plea colloquy after a factual basis was laid the trial
judge asked: "Did you do that?" Mitchell responded "Some of it.""0 After
further discussion concerning her liability as an aider and abettor Mitchell
persisted in her plea.
At the sentencing hearing a co-defendant testified regarding Mitchell's
role as a drug courier on a number of specific occasions. From this testimony
the sentencing judge inferred that Mitchell had been a drug courier on a
regular basis for over a year and a half and had sold up to two ounces a week
during this time."3 This put her over the five-kilogram threshold and resulted
in her receiving the mandatory ten-year minimum sentence. In handing
down this sentence the trial judge stated on the record that "one of the
things" that persuaded the court to rely upon the testimony of the co-
defendant was Mitchell's "not testifying to the contrary."
On appeal defendant argued that the judge had drawn an adverse infer-
ence from the defendant's silence in violation of her Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. The government, on the other hand, drew an analogy to the general rule
that a witness may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the
privilege with respect to the details. According to the government, the de-
fendant therefore waived any Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to the
details of the crime when she pled guilty. 3
Rejecting this argument Justice Kennedy, writing for Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer, distinguished the rule for witnesses, noting that the
policy concerns which justify cross-examination of a defendant who testifies
about a subject are not applicable to the plea colloquy, which exists as a pro-
tection against defendants making unintelligent and involuntary pleas.' The
government's rule, Kennedy said, would turn "this constitutional shield into
a prosecutorial sword."'235
The majority also refused to retreat from the rule against adverse infer-
ences from a defendant's silence. Finding the rule to be of "proven utility"
Justice Kennedy observed in language reminiscent of Escobedo and
Miranda:
[T]here can be little doubt that the rule prohibiting an inference of guilt
from a defendant's rightful silence has become an essential feature of our
legal tradition .... The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument
for teaching that the question in a criminal case is not whether the defen-
dant committed the acts of which he is accused. The question is whether
230. Id. at 318.
231. See id. at319.
232. Id. at 320.
233. See id. at 321.
234. See id. at 322-23.
235. Id. at 322.
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the government has carried its burden torove its allegations while re-
specting the defendant's individual rights.
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor and
Thomas dissented. The dissenters agreed that Mitchell had the right to in-
voke the Fifth Amendment at sentencing, but would permit the sentencing
judge to draw adverse inferences from her "uncooperativeness" in failing to
testify about her participation in the crime. 7 Justice Thomas, in a separate
dissent, went even further, indicating that he would overrule Griffin v. Cali-
fornia,238 which established the ban on drawing adverse inferences from a de-
fendant's silence at the guilt phase. 9
United States v. Balsys 4
In Balsys, the Court held that fear of criminal prosecution by a foreign
government, without any danger of prosecution in the United States, will not
justify the refusal of a person to testify pursuant to a subpoena.24 The Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination therefore
does not provide any protection for a witness who is in danger of only for-
eign prosecution.
Balsys, a resident alien in the United States, was the subject of a depor-
tation proceeding.242 The allegations in support of his deportation were that
Balsys gave false information in his application for entry into the United
States about his activities during World War II in Europe. 3 Apparently there
was good reason to believe he had been a concentration camp guard who
participated in many murders in the camp. Balsys was subpoenaed by the
United States government to testify at a deposition in preparation for the de-
portation hearing. Balsys refused to testify, claiming his right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.2" Balsys con-
ceded that the privilege against self-incrimination could not be asserted in
the deportation proceeding itself because of its civil character,245 but raised
instead his fear of criminal prosecution for war crimes. The government
agreed that his fear of criminal prosecution for his wartime activities, by
Lithuania, his native country, and also Israel were "real and substantial."
236. Id. at 330.
237. See id. at 331 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
239. See id. at 342 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
241. See id. at 669.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 670.
245. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
246. Id at n.2 (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972)).
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There was, however, no realistic fear of prosecution by the United States. A
prosecution for perjury in his application for entry into the United States was
barred by the statute of limitations, and none of his suspected war crimes
were within the jurisdiction of the United States. The government moved to
compel the testimony and the federal district court ordered Balsys to tes-
tify. 7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order, hold-
ing that Balsys could assert a Fifth Amendment privilege although his only
reasonable fear of prosecution was by foreign governments. " The United
States Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that a witness had
no right to assert the privilege where his fear of prosecution lay only in a
foreign state. ' 9 The majority opinion was by Justice Souter. Justices Gins-
burg and Breyer dissented.
Balsys' principal argument was that the Fifth Amendment's Self in-
crimination Clause, by its unequivocal terms, embraced any and all criminal
prosecution.' The Fifth Amendment states that a person shall not be com-
pelled "in any criminal case" to be a witness against himself."' The majority
agreed that the phrase, "any," standing alone would appear to require protec-
tion with respect to potential foreign as well as domestic criminal prosecu-
tions. The majority, however, held that the Self-incrimination Clause should
be examined in the context of entire Fifth Amendment.' The Court noted
that all of the other clauses in the Fifth Amendment, such as the grand jury
guarantee, protection against double jeopardy, due process, and compensa-
tion for taking property, only bind the United States and not any other for-
eign government. Indeed, until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
none of the provisions of the Fifth Amendment even applied to the govern-
ments of the states of the United States. Placing the Self-incrimination
Clause in that context, the majority held that the Clause is without import as
to the threat of foreign prosecution. Accordingly, Balsys could not claim a
right to remain silent despite his realistic fear of criminal prosecution in
Lithuania or Israel. 3
The Court did intimate a limitation on its otherwise broad holding. This
exception dealt with the possibility of admissions being extracted and used
in the prosecution of a crime which was common to both the United States
and a foreign country.' If, the majority observed, it was shown that the
United States granted immunity from domestic prosecution for a specific
crime and compelled testimony for the purpose of delivering that testimony
to prosecutors in another country so they could prosecute the same crime
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 671.
250. See id. at 672.
251. U.S. CONST. amend V.
252. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 673.
253. See id. at 674.
254. See id. at 698.
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there, then the self-incrimination clause might be triggered, because the
prosecution could not be "fairly characterized as distinctly 'foreign."' De-
spite a treaty between the United States and Lithuania which provided that
the two governments "agree to cooperate in prosecution of person who are
alleged to have committed war crimes" there was no showing, however, that
"complementary substantive offenses" were involved in Balsys' case.16 Thus
the Court concluded that the "mere support of one nation for the prosecution
efforts of another does not transform the prosecution of the one into the
prosecution of the other." ' This part of the majority opinion, while com-
manding a majority of the Court, was not joined by Justices Scalia or Tho-
mas.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer dissented. Justice Ginsburg, in her short
opinion, argued that the Fifth Amendment, as an expression of "fundamental
decency" and "civilized governmental conduct," should apply when there is
a reasonable fear of foreign prosecution. 8 Justice Breyer, also joined by
Ginsburg, argued that given the express terms of the self-incrimination pro-
hibition (i.e. "any criminal case,") and prior precedent, 9 national boundaries
should not erode the basic values underlying the Fifth Amendment."
V. CONFRONTATION
Gray v. Maryland26'
In Gray, Kevin Gray and Anthony Bell were charged with the beating
murder of Stacy Williams in 1993.262 Anthony Bell confessed to the police
that he, Kevin Gray, and '"Tank" Vanlandingham had committed the crime.
Subsequently, Vanlandingham died. Gray and Bell were indicted for mur-
der. 63 Gray moved for a separate trial, which was denied. At trial the prose-
cutor introduced the confession of Bell, in which he implicated Gray. To
avoid the impact of Bruton v. United States," the prosecution substituted a
255. Id.
256. Id at 700.
257. Id at 702.
258. See id. at 701-02.
259. Justice Breyer relied upon Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor,
378 U.S. 52 (1964) which held that witnesses granted immunity from state prosecution could
nevertheless assert their fear of federal prosecution as a bar against compelling them to testify
in a state proceeding. Justice Breyer read Murphy as abolishing the "same sovereign" rule of
United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931), which had held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege could only be asserted against the jurisdiction seeking to compel the self-
incriminating statements. The majority, however, disavowed this broad reading of Murphy,
finding its historical premises flawed and its reasoning unsound. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 688.
260. See Balsys, 524 U.S. at 703.
261. 523 U.S. 185 (1998).
262. See id. at 187.
263. See id.
264. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Bruton held that the introduction of a non-testifying co-
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blank for the defendant's name." Then a police officer read the confession
to the jury. When the policeman had finished reading the confession, the
prosecutor asked him whether after Bell gave him this information, the po-
liceman was able to arrest Gray. The policeman answered, "Yes."2"
In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court held that substi-
tuting a blank or the word "deleted" for the defendant's name still consti-
tuted a violation of Bruton and the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confront the non-testifying witnesses against him.67 Breyer acknowledged
that Richardson v. Marsh63 held that if the confession did not facially impli-
cate the defendant, a non-testifying co-defendant's confession could be in-
troduced into evidence. 69 However, he pointed out that this case was more
like Bruton, because the State did not delete all reference to the defendant in
the confession, as had been done in Richardson."
The dissent, authored by Justice Scalia, and joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that the deletion fell within the
exception to Bruton carved out by the Court's holding in Richardson."'
Lilly v. Virginia"2
This capital case involved the admission into evidence of a co-
defendant's confession "against penal interest," as an exception to the hear-
say rule and defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. 3 The Court
per Justice Stevens, however, reversed on the grounds that the non-testifying
co-defendant's confession was not so much against the declarant's penal in-
terest as it was against the penal interest of the defendant, and therefore was
not reliable enough to be admitted into evidence without cross-
examination.2"4
The facts of the case are as follows: Three men, Benjamin Lilly, his
brother Mark, and Gary Wayne Barker broke into a home and stole nine bot-
tles of liquor, three loaded guns, and a safe. They consumed the liquor, and
defendant' s confession implicating another defendant on trial in the same proceeding vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution since the defen-
dant was not able to cross-examine the confessing co-defendant. See SHnELvI SINGER AND
MARSHALL J. HARTMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK, § 22.3 (1986)
for a discussion of Bruton and its progeny.
265. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 187.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 188.
268. 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
269. See Gray, 523 U.S. at 188 (citing Richardson v. March, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)).
270. See id. at 191.
271. See id. at 193 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
272. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
273. See generally id.
274. See id. at 123.
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later robbed a store."' Then they kidnapped Alex DeFilippis, stole his car,
and killed him. They committed two additional robberies before being ap-
prehended by the police."6
All three men were questioned separately, and Mark stated that he was
pretty drunk from the liquor taken in the burglary and a twelve-pack of beer
taken during one of the robberies. However, he "admitted" that his brother,
Benjamin was behind the carjacking and had personally shot DeFilippis,
while he (Mark) had nothing to do with the killing.2'
At Benjamin's trial, the State introduced the tape recordings and tran-
scripts of Mark's interrogation, including the section where he implicated
Benjamin. The Judge allowed the tape-recording and transcripts, and
Benjamin was found guilty and sentenced to death. The Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court, however, granted certio-
rari and reversed. 8
The leading case in the field, prior to Lilly, in which the State attempted
to use the confession of a non-testifying accomplice to implicate the defen-
dant, was Bruton v. United States."' In that case, Evans and Bruton were
charged in a joint trial with armed postal robbery. An inspector testified that
Evans had confessed to him that he (Evans) and Bruton had committed the
crime."' The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that Bruton's Right of Confrontation had been violated. Even though the
confession was admissible against Evans, as a statement against his "penal
interest," its use was not justified against Bruton."'
The importance of the "penal interest" exception for the defendant was
highlighted in Chambers v. Mississippi.2" In that case, Chambers was
charged with the murder of a policeman. An individual named McDonald
informed Chambers' lawyers that he had committed the crime, but he re-
fused to testify to that at Chambers' trial. Mississippi evidentiary rules
barred the use of McDonald's admissions as hearsay. The United States Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the requirements of "due process"
trumped Mississippi's Evidence Code and made admissible McDonald's
admission that he had killed the police officer. 3
However, when a confession made by a declarant implicates the defen-
dant on trial, while minimizing the role of the declarant, the courts have tra-
ditionally viewed such "admissions against penal interest" with great cau-
275. See id. at 121.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 116.
279. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
280. See id. at 126 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1998)).
281. See id. (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. 123).
282. 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973).
283. See id.
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tion. For example, in Douglas v. Alabama,284 Justice Stevens points out that
the Court held that the admission of a non-testifying accomplice's confes-
sion, shifting responsibility and implicating the defendant as the "trigger-
man," "plainly denied [the defendant] the right of cross-examination secured
by the Confrontation Clause."2"
Having discussed the three above-mentioned cases, Justice Stevens then
turned to the test promulgated by the United States Supreme Court for de-
termining when such evidence would be admissible as an exception to the
right of confrontation. Under that test the evidence must fall within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception or otherwise possess particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. 86 Under that test, the "admission against penal interest" fails
in a situation where the declarant is minimizing his role in the crime and es-
sentially makes an admission against the "penal interest" of the defendant.
First, Stevens observed, "accomplice confessions that inculpate a crimi-
nal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule" '287
Secondly, Justice Stevens found that such accomplice statements generally
lack "particularized guarantees of reliability." Indeed, in the case at bar
"Mark was in custody for his involvement in and knowledge of serious
crimes and made his statements under the supervision of governmental au-
thorities .... Thus, Mark had a natural motive to attempt to exculpate him-
self as much as possible. 288
Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that "these factors militate against
finding that [the co-defendant's] statements were so inherently reliable that
cross-examination would have been superfluous." '89
VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Monge v. CalifoniaO"
In Monge, a non-capital case, the issue was whether Bullington v. Mis-
souri29' governed the sentencing enhancement proceeding so that an appel-
late reversal of the enhancement factor for lack of sufficient evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt would trigger the double jeopardy bar to re-
284. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
285. Id. at 419.
286. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
287. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133.
288. Id. at 136.
289. Id. The case was remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court to determine whether the
Sixth Amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
290. 524 U.S. 721 (1998).
"Contributed by Kim Fawcett, Assistant Defender, Supreme Court Unit, Office of the Illi-
nois State Appellate Defender.
291. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
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sentencing on the enhancement factor, which would result in the defendant's
receiving a significantly lower prison sentence.2"
The Court held that Bullington does not govern in a non-capital case so
Monge could be remanded for re-sentencing on the enhancement factor
without violating double jeopardy.293 Justice O'Connor wrote the majority
opinion in a five-one-three split.
Monge was convicted of three drug-related offenses. Under California's
"three-strikes" statute, he was vulnerable to possible sentence enhancement
as he had a prior assault conviction, which constituted the first "strike. 294 If
proved under the statute, it would result in a doubling of his prison sentence.
Under the statute, the State had to prove two things: (1) that Monge person-
ally committed the assault and (2) that he used a dangerous weapon.295
The sentencing judge found both factors were proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, as the statute required.29 The Court of Appeals reversed for lack
of sufficient evidence to support the enhancement, holding that neither factor
was proved by the document the State offered in support. The Court of Ap-
peals relied on and applied Burks v. United States,29 and Bullington to bar
any further sentencing under the enhancement provisions of the statute."
The California Supreme Court reversed the double jeopardy ruling, holding
Bullington did not extend to non-capital sentencing proceedings.29 Thus,
Monge faced re-sentencing under the enhancement provisions when he filed
his certiorari petition.
Justice O'Connor held that sentencing does not place a defendant in
jeopardy of an "offense" and so there can be no second jeopardy at a normal
sentencing.' Also, sentencing determinations normally are not analogized to
an acquittal. Bullington provided an exception."' Bullington involved a jury
as the sentencer choosing between life and death, and it chose life. Then,
upon reversal of his conviction, Bullington learned the State would again
seek the death penalty."° In fact, this was the result of the re-sentencing upon
reconviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Jus-
tice Blackmun, held that the second death penalty violated double jeop-
ardy." 3 Although Justice Blackmun advanced a complicated analysis to ex-
plain why the Bullington fact-pattern created an exception to the general rule
292. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 724.
293. See id. at 734.
294. See id. at 725.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
298. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 725.
299. See id. at 726.
300. See id. at 728.
301. See id. at 730.
302. See id.
303. See id.
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that double jeopardy does not apply to sentences, Justice Powell, in dissent,
essentially characterized the Bullington result as a "death is different" analy-
sis.
In Monge, the Bullington analysis was reviewed by Justice O'Connor.
She noted first that Bullington's first jury operated in a trial-like proceeding
during the sentencing phase; second that the jury had a choice between two
well-defined alternatives under standards to guide its decision; third that the
State was required to prove the facts that made Bullington eligible for death
beyond a reasonable doubt in a separate proceeding; and fourth that the or-
deal, anxiety, and expense of a capital sentencing hearing made it equal to a
trial on guilt and innocence so that the State might fairly be limited to one
fair opportunity to obtain a sentence of death or be forever barred from ob-
taining it? Justice O'Connor then distinguished Monge's fact setting from
Bullington's, stating that even if there were similarities in the procedural
protections involved under the two statutes, i.e., proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, a separate proceeding, etc., the important difference was that Bulling-
ton involved a capital sentencing? 5 A capital sentencing proceeding is prac-
tically a continuation of the trial on guilt or innocence, is unique in both its
severity and finality, and calls for greater reliability, which parallels the
double jeopardy clause's concern for preventing repeated attempts at con-
victing someone who, though innocent, may thereby be found guilty."6 Bull-
ington turned on both the nature of the proceedings and the consequences of
the adverse result to the defendant. Therefore, even though the three strikes
statute paralleled a capital sentencing hearing and had many trial-like protec-
tions, those were not enough to convert the non-capital sentencing into a
candidate for inclusion in the Bullington exception.7" Monge could be re-
sentenced consistently with the constitution.
Justice Stevens dissented and stated that double jeopardy should bar the
re-sentencing because there was a factual insufficiency in the evidence." 3 He
also seemed concerned about sentence enhancement practices and double
jeopardy because he stated in a footnote that the consequences of the major-
ity opinion were accurately characterized by Justice Scalia as "sinister. '
Justice Stevens also pointed out that the first steps down this road were taken
by the Supreme Court in McMillan v. Pennsylvania."'
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, agreed that Bull-
ington should not be extended and that the double jeopardy clause does not
304. See id. at 730-31.
305. See id. at 731.
306. See id. at 732, n.8.
307. See id. at 734.
308. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11
(1978)).
309. Id. at 737 n.8.
310. 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that weapons sentencing enhancement provision does
not violate double jeopardy).
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apply to non-capital sentencing proceedings, but thought there was a larger
problem and that Monge did not merely involve a sentencing proceeding?"
Justice Scalia questioned whether a state could redefine a crime to have one
element and call all of the other elements "sentencing enhancements,"
thereby excluding their determination from the protections of the Constitu-
tion." 2 For example, he asked whether a state could enact only one crime,
"knowingly causing injury to another," punish it by 30 days in jail, and then
add a series of sentencing enhancements authorizing increased punishment,
up to life in prison without parole, but limit all present trial protections only
to the 30-day offense. 3 Justice Scalia said this "gimmick" is the "El Do-
rado" of those who seek a "means of dispensing with inconvenient constitu-
tional 'rights."' 1 4
Justice Scalia's useful and thought-provoking opinion is worthy of care-
ful study because he addresses the need for a coherent fundamental analysis
of the double jeopardy clause and the limits which should be placed on state
legislatures when they define crimes and punishments in ways that evade the
clause's protections. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority once again
illustrates her common law judge approach. If Justice Scalia is right, then
Justice O'Connor's opinion has to be wrong. If Justice O'Connor can factu-
ally distinguish Justice Scalia's hypothetical case and adhere to tradition and
practice without being concerned about a cohesive and symmetrical body of
law, then she is right. The outcome may depend on just which approach is
taken at the outset. Justice Powell won this case, however, because Justice
O'Connor essentially followed his dissent in Bullington while paying lip
service to Justice Blackmun's analysis.
VII. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Mitigation
Buchanan v. Angelone1 s
A classic dichotomy in American death penalty jurisprudence is epito-
mized in theSupreme Court's opinion in Buchanan v. Angelone.316 The di-
chotomy is clearly explained by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion as
"the incompatibility between the Lockett-Eddings requirement and the hold-
ing of Furman v. Georgia."'7
311. See Monge, 524 U.S. at 737 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
312. Seeid. at738.
313. Id. at739-40.
314, Id.
315. 522 U.S. 269 (1998).
316, Id.
317. Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In Lockett v. Ohio,318 the United States Supreme Court vacated the death
sentence of a twenty-one-year-old woman because, under Ohio law, the jury
was not permitted to learn about her background, low I.Q., or drug abuse
problems.319 In holding that the Ohio death penalty statute was too restrictive
in not allowing the jury to consider her age, prior record, social background,
and family history, the Court enunciated the doctrine that in a death penalty
case, the sentencer must be able to consider all possible factors that might be
mitigating. The Court concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that the sentencer.. . not be precluded from considering as a
mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character or record.""32
In Eddings v. Oklahoma,32 the defendant, a sixteen-year-old male, shot
and killed a highway patrol officer.322 As in Lockett, the sentencing judge re-
fused to consider evidence of the defendant's difficult childhood, mental and
emotional age below the norm, having been raised by an alcoholic mother,
and having suffered physical abuse at the hands of his father.323 The trial
judge also ignored testimony regarding the excellent chances for Eddings'
rehabilitation, and a psychiatrist's testimony that after treatment, Eddings
would not pose a threat to society. The judge took into account only Ed-
dings' age as a mitigating factor before imposing the death penalty.324 In re-
versing, the United States Supreme Court reiterated its doctrine in Lockett
and held that "the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating evi-
dence. , 3
s
According to Justice Scalia, however, in sharp contrast to this policy of
bringing every possible mitigating factor before the sentencing court or jury
lies the doctrine of Furman v. Georgia,326 which seeks to constrain the sen-
tencer's discretion in order "to avoid arbitrary or freakish imposition of the
death penalty. 327
In Furman, the Court was concerned with the unbridled discretion pos-
sessed by sentencing jurors to kill a defendant influenced by factors such as
the race of the victim, race of the defendant, poverty, religion, gender, as
well as the nature of the crime. These and other factors were seemingly Ap-
plied in a random fashion in deciding who should receive the death penalty.
Outlawing such unbridled discretion, the Supreme Court held the death pen-
alty unconstitutional as then administered in 1972.32' Thereafter, thirty six
318. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
319. See id. at 587.
320. Id. at 589.
321. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
322. See id. at 107.
323. See id. at 110.
324. See id.
325. Id. at 113.
326. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
327. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269,277 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
328. See Funnan, 408 U.S. at 238.
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states revised their statutes to limit the imposition of the death penalty to
narrowly delineated statutory categories, such as the killing of a police offi-
cer, firefighter, child, or prison guard, or murder during the commission of a
felony.
For Justice Scalia, however, the dilemma is how to reconcile the fact
that on the one hand, the Court attempts to shackle the sentencing jury and
narrow the focus of its options, while on the other hand, it attempts to insure
that the jury hears all relevant mitigating evidence before deciding the ulti-
mate question of life or death."9
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion in Buchanan, attempted
to resolve this issue by separating the sentencing function into two parts.
First is the "eligibility" part, during which the sentencer determines whether
the defendant fits into one of the narrowly delineated statutory categories of
those persons eligible for death in a given state, fulfilling the narrowing
function mandated by Furman.3"'
The second part of the sentencing function is the "selection" phase, dur-
ing which the sentencer hears all aggravating and mitigating evidence and
determines the life or death of the defendant, fulfilling the mandates of Ed-
dings, and Lockett.33" '
For Justice Scalia, the dichotomy is irreconcilable, and he would resolve
it by following Furman and narrowing the scope of eligibility, but he would
not follow Eddings or Lockett. He would not "require that sentencing juries
be given the discretion to consider mitigating evidence."332
This issue has been raised by Justice Scalia in other cases,333 but never
as sharply as in Buchanan. Justice Scalia concluded by saying that "[t]he
Court's ongoing attempt to resolve that contradiction by drawing an arbitrary
line in the sand between the 'eligibility and selection phases' of the sentenc-
ing decision is ... incoherent and ultimately doomed to failure."3
Nevertheless, that is exactly what Justice Rehnquist did in his decision.
He drew the arbitrary line, but in doing so affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion and sentence of death.335 The petitioner defendant, Douglas Buchanan,
was charged with the murder of his father, stepmother, and two brothers.336
The Virginia Code listed specific aggravating and mitigating factors. Among
the aggravating factors that would allow the consideration of a death sen-
tence was that the killing was vile, and the prosecutor based his request for
death on that factor.337
329. See generally Buchanan, 522 U.S. 269.
330. See id. at 275.
331. See id.
332. Id. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring).
333. See generally Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
334. Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 277 (Scalia, J., concurring).
335. See id. at 269.
336. See id.
337. See id. at 274.
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Defense counsel had presented seven mitigation witnesses, including a
psychiatrist who testified that Buchanan was under extreme emotional dis-
tress at the time of the murders. Counsel then requested four instructions,
which were based on mitigating factors listed in the Virginia Code.33 These
included instructions on the fact that Buchanan had no significant criminal
history, he was under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the kill-
ing, he was young, and he had impaired capacity to appreciate the criminal-
ity of his act.339 Counsel also requested an additional instruction relative to
the background of the defendant and any other mitigating facts.
The trial court refused to give those specific instructions and instead
told the jury that "if you believe from all the evidence that the death penalty
is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the Defendant at life
imprisonment. '
The jury voted for a sentence of death, and the trial judge imposed it.
The conviction and sentence of death were upheld on state appeal, by the
federal district court, and by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.4 '
After noting the two aspects of the capital sentencing process, the "eli-
gibility" phase and the "selection" phase, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded
that although the sentencer could not be precluded from considering any
constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, the Supreme Court had never
"gone further and held that the state must affirmatively structure in a particu-
lar way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence.""2
Therefore, Justice Rehnquist held, since the jury instructions directed
the jury to base its decision on "all the evidence," the instructions did not
foreclose any mitigating evidence from the jury's consideration, and the
Virginia practice of not specifying mitigating factors was constitutional. 3
Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented." They agreed with
the majority that the proper standard to be applied to jury instructions was
"whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally rele-
vant evidence."3 '5 The dissenters, however, pointed out that the trial judge
had instructed the jury that if the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Buchanan killed any one of the four victims in an outrageously vile
manner, the jury should fix his punishment at death. Only if they found that
the State had not proved that "vileness" beyond all reasonable doubt, or "if
they believed from all the evidence" that the death penalty was not war-
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 274.
341. See id. at 269.
342. Id. at 273.
343. See id. at 275.
344. See id. at 278 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 272.
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ranted, then and only then could the jury impose a sentence of life impris-
onment.' The dissenters felt it was not clear to the jury that they were to
consider the mitigating factors of the defendant's extreme emotional distur-
bance at the time of the killing, his youth, etc. Therefore, they would have
required that the judge instruct the jurors specifically with respect to the
mitigating factors."
Although no other Justice seemed to agree with Justice Scalia, the prac-
tical effect of the majority opinion is to solidify his position because in fact
the jury is now not required to be specifically instructed as to even relevant
statutory mitigating factors. Therefore, in a given case, the jury might fail to
specifically consider those factors as they vote for death.
B. Jury Instructions on Deadlock
Jones v. United States3'
Louis Jones Jr., kidnapped Private Tracie Joy McBride at gunpoint from
the Goodfellow Air Force Base in San Angelo, Texas.l 9 He brought her to
his house and sexually assaulted her. He then drove her to a bridge just out-
side of San Angelo, where he repeatedly struck her in the head with a tire
iron.'"
In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court rejected Petitioner's claims that the
instructions and Verdict Forms given to the jury confused jurors about the
consequences of a deadlock, and held that failure to give a defense requested
instruction on the consequences of "dead lock" did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 5 ' The defense instruction had sought to inform jurors that if
they were unable to unanimously agree on the sentence to be imposed, the
court would impose life imprisonment without possibility of release.3'
C. Jury's Obligation to Consider Lesser-Offenses
Hopkins v. Reeves'53
The Court in Hopkins held that when a defendant is charged with a capi-
tal offense (in this case felony murder) and the evidence would support a
jury verdict of second degree murder or manslaughter (non-capital crimes),
346. See id. at 278.
347. See id.
348. 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
349. See id. at 389.
350. See id.
351. Seeid. at373.
352. See id. at 379.
353. 524 U.S. 88 (1998).
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the state is not constitutionally required to give the jury a lesser included of-
fenses instruction, where state law does not classify those crimes as lesser-
included offenses of felony murder.'5
This prosecution arose in Nebraska State court, where Reeves was
charged with two felony murders in the course of a rape. Under Nebraska
law, the intent to kill is conclusively presumed if the State proves defen-
dant's intent to commit the underlying felony. 55 Felony murder is a capital
offense in Nebraska, and sentencing in capital cases is the function of a
three-judge sentencing panel when the jury returns a felony murder ver-
dict. 56 Reeves was convicted of two felony murders by a jury and sentenced
to death by a three-judge panel. The evidence at trial was that Reeves killed
two women and raped at least one of the women. After his arrest, Reeves
admitted to police the rape, but said he could not recall much about the kill-
ings because he was highly intoxicated.3"
Essentially, Reeves argued that second degree murder and manslaughter
instructions and verdicts should have been given to the jury for its considera-
tion because some of the evidence supported such verdicts. Under Nebraska
law, second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill but manslaugh-
ter, apparently, does not.358 However, neither offense is a lesser-included of-
fense of felony murder.359 Nevertheless, Reeves argued that the failure of the
trial judge to give the jury defense-tendered second degree and manslaughter
verdict possibilities when such verdicts could have been justified by the evi-
dence violated the rule of Beck v. Alabama.3"' In Beck,36" ' an Alabama statute
barred a jury from considering any lesser-included offense in a death penalty
case.362 Hence, the jury was required to find the capital murder defendant
guilty as charged or entirely acquit. All other non-capital trials required that
the jury consider lesser-included offenses when the evidence would support
a lesser verdict. Beck held the statute unconstitutional. Reeves argued that
his jury confronted the same predicament as the Beck jury. They had to de-
cide whether to convict him of capital murder or entirely acquit him, even
thought they believed him to be guilty of a lesser criminal homicide.3"
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Reeves' petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, but Justice Thomas, writing for eight Justices, reversed the
circuit court and affirmed the convictions and death sentence.6 Justice Ste-
354. See id.
355. See id. at 90.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 94.
358. See id. at 98.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. 477 U.S. 625 (1980).
362. See Reeves, 524 U.S. 90 (citing Beck, 447 U.S. 625).
363. See id. at 96.
364. See id. at 104.
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vens dissented."
Justice Thomas ruled that the significant difference between Reeves and
Beck was that in Beck the state law accepted the lesser offenses as included
offenses in all cases except capital cases.3" Hence, the exclusive limitation
unfairly discriminated against a capital case defendant. In Nebraska, on the
other hand, capital cases are not treated differently from non-capital cases.
Justice Thomas' opinion also rejected the circuit court's reliance on Ti-
son v. Arizona,"' and Enmund v. Florida.3" Justice Thomas stated that those
cases merely held that persons convicted of felony murder could not be sen-
tenced to death unless the defendant intended to kill or had a culpable state
of mind regarding the killing, apart from the state of mind presumed from
the underlying felony.369 In Nebraska, the jury did not impose death sen-
tences; only a three-judge panel had that power. Therefore, the same con-
cerns were not present because the Tison-Enmund limitation could be ade-
quately addressed by the three-judge sentencing panel.
Justice Stevens dissented because he felt that to be consistent with En-
mund, Tison, and Beck, when the State asks for the death penalty on a felony
murder charge, it must allow the jury to consider lesser offenses when sup-
ported by the evidence regardless of the State's otherwise limited definition
of "lesser included offenses."' 70
VIII. HABEAS CORPUS CASES
A. Exhaustion of State Remedies
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel'
A state prison must first exhaust available state remedies before seeking
federal habeas corpus relief.3" In a 6-3 decision, which pushes the etiquette
of federalism to new extremes, the Court held that petitioner procedurally
defaulted constitutional claims raised on direct appeal in state court because
he failed to include those issues in his petition for discretionary review in the
state's court of last resort.
Darren Boerckel, a mentally handicapped seventeen year old was con-
victed in 1977 of rape, burglary and aggravated battery of an eighty-seven
365. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
366. See id. at 98.
367. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
368. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
369. See Reeves, 524 U.S. at 102.
370. See id. at 104 (Stevens., J., dissenting).
371. 526 U.S. 838 (1999).
372. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(I), (c).
373. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 842.
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year old woman, largely on the basis of his confession. 74 He appealed his
conviction to the Appellate Court of Illinois on a number of grounds, includ-
ing the claim that his confession was involuntary and was made without a
knowing and intelligent Miranda waiver.?" The intermediate appellate court,
with one judge dissenting, considered and rejected all claims, affirming his
conviction."' In his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court,
Boerckel did not raise the Miranda and voluntariness issues but focused in-
stead on the issue which attracted the dissent: whether Boerckel had been il-
legally arrested at the time he confessed." The Illinois Supreme Court, exer-
cising its discretionary power to control its docket, denied the petition for
leave to appeal. 78
In 1994 Boerckel filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus.379
The District Court appointed counsel and in an amended petition counsel
raised the Miranda and voluntariness issues."' The District Court ruled that
Boerckel had procedurally defaulted on these claims by failing to raise them
in his petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.38' The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed concluding that a habeas petitioner
was not required to present claims in a petition for discretionary review in
order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement."
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by the Chief Justice, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter and Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit holding that a habeas petitioner must completely exhaust his state reme-
dies by giving the state courts "one full opportunity to resolve any constitu-
tional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established
appellate review process." ' Justice O'Connor observed that the exhaustion
requirement is a rule of comity which "reduces friction" between the state
and federal court systems by avoiding the "unseemliness" of a federal dis-
trict judge overturning a state court conviction on the basis of constitutional
claims which have not been addressed by the state courts in the first in-
stance.3" Justice O'Connor noted, however, that this rule of gentility did not
require a state prisoner to invoke " any possible avenue of state court re-
view." Observing that a petition for discretionary review in the Illinois Su-
preme Court is a "normal, simple and established part of the State's appel-
374. See id.
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 843.
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 844.
382. See id.
383. Id. at 845(emphasis added).
384. See id. at 846.
385. Id. at 844.
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late review process, 386 she distinguished extraordinary remedies such as a
suit for injunction, a writ of prohibition or mandamus, or a suit for declara-
tory judgment "when those remedies are alternatives to the standard review
process and where the state courts have not provided relief though those
remedies in the past.' 387 This latter qualification, of course, muddies the wa-
ters considerably. At what point will the successful use of an extraordinary
remedy make it part of the "ordinary review process?
' 388
Justice Souter, while joining Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
concurred to express his understanding that a state prisoner could "skip a
procedure even when a state court has occasionally employed it to provide
relief so long as the State has identified it as outside the standard review
process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for the purpose of ex-
haustion." '389 Justice Souter cited as an example of such a plain statement, the
declaration of the Supreme Court of South Carolina: "[I]n all appeals from
criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be
required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all
available state remedies ....
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer joined. 9' In Justice Stevens' view the majority conflated the ex-
haustion requirement and the doctrine of procedural default. Because
Boerckel in fact had no available state remedy at the time he filed his federal
habeas petition, Stevens found that the exhaustion requirement was met."9 In
his view a habeas petitioner is only required to exhaust state remedies which
are presently available at the time the petition is filed. The procedural default
doctrine, on the other hand, was designed to prevent state prisoners from de-
liberately letting time run on available and adequate state remedies in order
to utilize the federal court system.393 The issue was therefore a question of
fairness: Did petitioner give the state a fair opportunity to rule on his consti-
tutional claims before running to federal court? Clearly, asserted Stevens,
counsel's limiting of the issues on a petition for discretionary review to those
likely to prevail was "the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy."'31 Ste-
vens noted that the majority's requirement that all issues must be raised on
discretionary review will, given the imposition of page limits such as those
imposed by the Supreme Court itself, lead to less effective advocacy with
386. Id. at 846.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 848.
389. Id. at 850 (Souter, J., concurring).
390. Id. (quoting In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post Conviction
Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (1990)).
391. See id. at 851 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
392. See id.
393. See id. at 854.
394. Id. at 858 (quoting Jones v. Barns, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983)).
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respect to those issues deserving full attention. Further, the requirement will
impose additional burdens on the state appellate system as petitions for dis-
cretionary review will have to be filed in all cases if the federal habeas rem-
edy is to be preserved. Thus, the rule not only promotes bad lawyering but,
as Justice Stevens observed, turns federalism on its head by delaying the
completion of litigation and increasing the workload of state supreme courts.
B. Successor Petitions and Incompetency to be Executed
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal3'
In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,396 the Supreme Court dealt with the
question of whether a petition raising the issue of incompetency can be
barred by the strict successor provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). "
In Ford v. Wainwright,39 the Supreme Court held that a person who was
incompetent could not be executed under the cruel and unusual clause of the
Eighth Amendment.3 Martinez-Villareal filed such a claim in his first ha-
beas petition in 1993, but it was dismissed as premature because death was
not imminent.
Later, Martinez-Villareal filed the same claim in a subsequent habeas
petition in 1997 after the State of Arizona had issued a warrant for his execu-
tion and he had been found fit to be executed by a state court.4 The State
objected on the grounds that the 1997 claim constituted a successor habeas
petition, which did not meet the requirements for successor petitions under
395. 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
396. Id.
397. AEDPA was passed by Congress on April 24, 1996. Under the new AEDPA provi-
sions, federal courts still retain the power to oversee state criminal proceedings via the writ of
habeas corpus, but the balance of power has shifted dramatically back to the states. AEDPA
severely restricts the filing of successor petitions for federal habeas relief. In order to be ac-
cepted, the successor petition must meet new standards. For example, under Section
2244(2)(A) the new claim must be based upon a "new rule" of constitutional law made retro-
active to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court. This is virtually an
impossible burden because the Supreme Court has held that a "new rule" of constitutional law
will almost never be applied to cases on collateral review. See Teague v. Lane 489 U.S. 288
(1989). In addition, under Section 2244(3)(A), instead of filing in the district court, as under
the former statute, a motion for leave to file a successor petition must first be presented to the
Court of Appeals. Thereafter, under subsection 3(E), if the Court of Appeals denies the mo-
tion for leave to file the successor petition, there is no further appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court on this petition. These new restrictions make it exceedingly difficult to file "suc-
cessor" petitions under AEDPA. See e.g. Roldan v. United States, 96 F.3d 1013 (1996). For a
fuller explication and discussion of the AEDPA, see Marshall Hartman & Jeannette Nyden,
Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 337 (1997).
398. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
399. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 639 (citing Wainright, 477 U.S. 399).
400. See id. at 640.
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the new AEDPA.?"
Under the AEDPA, successive petitions could be filed only if the claim
relied on a new rule of constitutional law held retroactive by the United
States Supreme Court to cases on collateral review, or if the claim would
clearly establish the innocence of the petitioner.'
Since the claim of incompetency to be executed could not satisfy either
of those requirements, the district court dismissed the claim. °3 The court of
appeals held that § 2244(b) did not apply to claims of incompetency to be
executed and reversed the district court.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reversed the Court of Appeals, but side
stepped the issue, holding that this claim should not be treated as a successor
petition.' The reason was that when it was raised the first time in 1993, it
was denied because it was not ripe for decision.' The Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the district court for a hearing on the merits. Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented.'
C. Power to Stay Execution Based upon Claim of Actual Innocence
Calderon v. Thompson'
In Calderon v. Thompson, Thomas Thompson met twenty-year old Gin-
ger at a pizza parlor. They went to several bars, and then to Thompson's
apartment.' Three days later Ginger's body was found in a field ten miles
from the apartment Thompson shared with his roommate, David Leitch. She
had been stabbed five times in the head and was wearing unbuttoned jeans
with no underwear."' Her shirt and bra had been cut and sperm consistent
with Thompson's was found in her body."' A footprint near the body was
found that matched that of one of David Leitch's shoes. Additionally, fibers
from the blanket with which the body was wrapped were found to be similar
to fibers found in the trunk of Leitch's car."' Thompson initially admitted
that he had raped Ginger, but later stated that they had consensual sex.'
401. See id. at 642.
402, See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
403. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 640.
404. See id.
405. See id. at 644.
406. The defendant could not have been executed at that time, and therefore the claim
was not "exhausted" in state court through no fault of the defendant.
407. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 645.
408. 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
409. See id. at 542.
410. See id. at 543.
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. See id. at 544.
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Thompson was found guilty of rape and murder and sentenced to
death.4' Leitch was found guilty of second degree murder by a separate jury.
The California Supreme Court affirmed, and three state habeas petitions
were denied.415 Thereafter, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
Federal District Court and the Court granted relief on the rape charges.1 6 It
held that his trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to cross-
examine vigorously the state's forensic experts and two jailhouse infor-
mants. The District Court then vacated the death penalty."7
Thereafter, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated the judgment of the District Court.418 The Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari, and an execution date was set for August 5, 1997. Undaunted,
Thompson filed a fourth state habeas petition alleging that David Leitch had
stated in a parole hearing that he had witnessed Thompson and Ginger hav-
ing consensual sex the night of the murder.1 9 That petition was denied, but
then Thompson moved the Court of Appeals to recall its mandate. He also
moved the District Court for relief on the basis of Leitch' s statement to the
Parole Board.42
The District Court construed Thompson's motion as a successive fed-
eral habeas corpus petition, which must meet the standard of actual inno-
cence under the provisions of the AEDPA"2 The Court held that he could
not meet that standard, given the other evidence in the case, and denied re-
lief." At first, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court and de-
nied relief, but then it learned that, due to an administrative error, two jus-
tices had failed to vote on the original motion for rehearing en banc.4'
Therefore, four days before the scheduled execution, the Court of Appeals
called for oral argument on the question of whether a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice might occur if Thompson were to be executed.4 "
In the meantime, the Governor denied clemency. However, on August
3, 1997, two days before the scheduled execution, a divided Court of Ap-
peals recalled the mandate.' Relying only on the record in the first habeas
petition, (thereby avoiding the AEDPA restrictions on successor petitions) it
held that the District Court had been correct in finding that trial counsel had
been ineffective with respect to the rape charge both in the guilt-innocence
414. See id.
415. See id. at 544-45.
416. See id. at 545.
417. See id.
418. See id. at 545-46.
419. See id. at 546.
420. See id.
421. See id. at 547.
422. See id.
423. See id. at 548.
424. See id. at 547.
425. See id. at 548.
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phase, and during the sentencing hearing, and it vacated the death sen-
tence.26
The State of California filed mandamus in the United States Supreme
Court, which the Court construed as a petition for Certiorari, and granted it
to determine whether the Court of Appeals had abused its discretion in re-
calling the mandate and granting relief.4 7
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy held that the Court of Appeals had
abused its discretion. 28 Joining Kennedy were O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Souter dissented, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. 9 The Court held that in the interests of finality of state criminal
judgments, the Court of Appeals action, sixteen years after the murder, was
an abuse of discretion, unless its action was required to avoid a miscarriage
of justice."' That meant, consistent with Congressional intent expressed in
the new AEDPA, that the merits of a criminal conviction "not be revisited in
the absence of a strong showing of actual innocence.""43 It is interesting to
note that even though the Court states that the AEDPA does not specifically
govern this case, the discretion of the Court of Appeals must be consistent
with the "objects of the statute." 32
The majority opinion concludes that neither under the "actual inno-
cence" test of SchIup v. Delo,433 or the "innocence of the death penalty" stan-
dard enunciated in Sawyer v. Whitley,' could the defendant meet his burden
and demonstrate his innocence.43 In light of the other evidence on the charge
of rape, he could not show that "it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence."436 Nor could
he show "by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror would
have found him eligible for the death penalty in light of the new evidence."437
Therefore, the majority concluded because the execution of the defen-
dant would not result in a miscarriage of justice, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals abused its discretion in recalling its mandate and granting relief as
to the rape charge and the death sentence.438
Justice Souter, in dissent, begins by disagreeing with the standard of re-
view employed by the majority. He states that the proper standard of review
of the actions of the Court of Appeals should be one of "a high degree of
426. See id. at 549.
427. See id.
428. See id.
429. See id. at 566 (Souter, J., dissenting).
430. See id. at 566.
431. Id. at 558.
432. Id. at 554.
433. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
434. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
435. See id. at 560.
436. Id. at 559 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
437. Id. at 560 (quoting Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 348).
438. See id. at 566.
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deference."439 The dissent also disagrees with the notion that the AEDPA has
anything to do with this case.'8 Since the decision to recall the mandate was
sua sponte by the Court of Appeals, based on its realization that through ad-
ministrative error two justices of that court had failed to vote on the original
motion for rehearing en banc, this was not a case involving successor peti-
tions. Therefore, the AEDPA had absolutely no applicability.",
D. Harmless Error Under Habeas Review
Calderon v. Coleman, 2
In a per curiam opinion issued with four dissents the Court reaffirmed,
in a death penalty case, the special harmless error analysis established for
habeas review in Brecht v. Abrahamson.'8 Brecht departed from the Chap-
man v. California' test for harmless error on direct review. Under that test
the error required reversal unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 5 Brecht adopted a much stricter test, however, holding that even
where a "trial error" of constitutional dimension had occurred in a state
criminal proceeding, federal habeas relief could not be granted unless the
constitutional error had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the jury.4'
In Coleman the issue concerned erroneous instructions given to the jury
concerning the death penalty."7 The Caiifornia trial court gave what is called
a "Briggs" instruction, which informed the jury of the Governor's power to
commute or modify a sentence of life without possibility of parole to a lesser
sentence which could include the possibility of parole."8 The trial court then
stated: "You are now instructed, however, that the matter of a Governor's
commutation power is not to be considered by you in determining the pun-
ishment for this defendant.""' 9
In California v. Ramos,45 the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a Briggs
instruction against a federal constitutional challenge, but on remand the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had ruled that the instruction violated the California
State Constitution because it was misleading and invited the jury to consider
439. See id. at 567.
440. See id. at 572.
441. On July 14, 1998, Thomas Thompson, age 43, was executed by lethal injection by
the State of California.
442. 525 U.S. 141 (1998).
443. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
444. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
445. See generally id.
446. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619.
447. See Coleman, 525 U.S. at 144.
448. See id. at 142.
449. Id. at 142-43.
450. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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irrelevant and speculative matters.45 In Coleman's case the instruction thus
violated California law, but the California Supreme Court held that the error
was not prejudicial because the jury had been instructed not to consider the
possibility of commutation. '
On federal habeas review the District Court granted the writ because it
discovered that the Briggs instruction had incorrectly stated the Governor's
power to commute as applied to Coleman. 53 Because Coleman was a twice-
convicted felon, under California law had Coleman been sentenced to life
without possibility of parole, the Governor would have had no power to
commute his sentence without the approval of four justices of the California
Supreme Court.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, declaring
that a "commutation instruction is unconstitutional when it is inaccurate."
455
Without addressing the correctness of this "sweeping pronouncement," the
per curiam opinion simply reversed and remanded because the Ninth Circuit
failed to expressly undertake a Brecht harmless error analysis before allow-
ing habeas relief.456
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented, finding that
despite the Court of Appeals lack of clarity in addressing the issue of harm-
less error, the result was correct and the per curiam's remand therefore un-
dermined the state's interest in bringing litigation in capital cases to a
prompt conclusion by needlessly prolonging the proceedings.'
E. Teague Limited to New Procedural Rules
Bousley v. United States'8
Bousley was arrested in 1990 for alleged drug-trafficking activity con-
ducted in his garage. Firearms were also found, located in his bedroom.
Bousley pleaded guilty to "using" a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1) and to possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), reserving the right to challenge the quan-
tity of drugs used to determine the length of his sentence.459 The District
Court accepted both pleas and sentenced him to seventy-eight months im-
prisonment on the drug charges, sixty consecutive months on the firearms
charge, and four years of supervised release.' Bousley subsequently ap-
451. See Coleman, 525 U.S. at 144 (citing California v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136 (1984)).
452. See id.
453. See id.
454. See id.
455. Id. at 145 (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 150 F.3d 1105, 1118 (1998)).
456. See id. 148.
457. See id; at 149 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
458. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
459. See id. at 620.
460. See id.
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pealed his sentence, but did not appeal the validity of his plea. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. In 1994, Bousley sought a writ of habeas corpus, chal-
lenging the factual basis for his plea in that neither the evidence nor the plea
allocation showed a link between the firearms in the bedroom and the activ-
ity that occurred in the garage."' The District Court ordered that the appeal
be dismissed, finding that the guns were in close proximity and readily ac-
cessible. 2 Bousley appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Su-
preme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States 3 came down.' Bailey re-
quired that the government show "active employment of the firearm" to
fulfill § 924(c)(1)'s "use" prong. 5 Bousley's counsel argued that Bailey
should apply retroactively, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's order for dismissal.'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that
Bousley's initial guilty plea, to be valid, must have been "voluntary" and
"intelligent." He stipulated that in order for the plea to be intelligent, Bou-
sley must have been given "real notice of the true nature of the charges
against him." 7 The Court rejected the claim that Teague v. Lane46 barred
Bousley's appeal, holding that Teague's restriction on retroactivity applied
to new procedural rules of law, not to new substantive rules of law. 9 How-
ever, the majority also found that Bousley, in contesting his sentence, but not
the validity of his plea on appeal, had procedurally defaulted on his claim. 7
Justice Rehnquist noted that collateral review in such cases was limited to
those who could show "cause and prejudice," or actual innocence. While the
Court rejected Bousley's arguments for "cause," they remanded the case for
determination of actual innocence." Upon remand, Bousley would have to
show that no reasonable juror would have convicted him (in light of the new
interpretation of the "use" prong) of the charge at issue or of any other
charge foregone in exchange for the guilty plea. Because actual innocence,
and not legal insufficiency, would be at issue, neither the government nor the
defendant would be limited to the prior record, but could instead present any
available admissible evidence.47
461. See id.
462. See id. at 621.
463. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
464. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620.
465. See id. at 621 (citing Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144).
466. See id.
467. Id. at 618 (quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
468. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Teague held that ordinarily "new constitutional rules of crimi-
nal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new
rules are announced." Id. at 310.
469. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623.
470. See id. at 625.
471. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 628.
472. See id.
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Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with
the central holding of the majority. 3 He pointed out that Bousley had been
given critically incorrect legal advice, rendering Bousley's guilty plea, based
on such misinformation, constitutionally invalid.474 Justice Stevens added
that legal advice given in good faith reliance on judicial decisions was none
the less critically incorrect. Justice Stevens, however, argued that a constitu-
tionally invalid plea may be set aside on collateral review whether or not the
issue was previously raised on appeal, and would therefore have remanded
the case with instructions to vacate Bousley's initial plea and allow him to
plead anew.475
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.47 Justice Scalia ar-
gued that collateral review of issues procedurally defaulted should be heard
on a showing of "cause" and "prejudice," but that allowing a defendant to
claim "actual innocence," should be reserved for only those defendants who
were actually tried and convicted by a jury. Justice Scalia argued that allow-
ing an "actual innocence" claim by those who were not convicted by a jury
would create too great a burden on the criminal justice system. Further, that
would then require the government to litigate charges potentially made years
before, or even charges never made because they were foregone in exchange
for a guilty plea, where evidence may no longer be available.4"
F. International Law and the AEDPA
Breard v. Greene4
In Breard, the Court dealt with the impact of an international treaty on a
state's right to execute foreign-born nationals.479 Angel Breard came to Vir-
ginia from Paraguay in 1986 at the age of twenty. Seven years later he was
arrested and charged with the attempted rape and murder of Ruth Dickie"
Under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Breard was entitled to
contact the Paraguayan Consulate. He was never notified of that right by the
police.'
Breard rejected a plea bargain which offered a life sentence in return for
a guilty plea. Against the advice of his lawyers, Breard testified at his trial
that he murdered Dickie, but explained that he did so because of a Satanic
curse placed on him by his father-in-law. A jury convicted him and sen-
473. See id. at 629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
474. See id. at 630.
475. See id.
476. See id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
477. See id. at 639.
478. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
479. See generally id.
480. See id. at 372.
481. See id. at 373.
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tenced him to death." His conviction was affirmed, certiorari was denied,
and state collateral relief was denied as well. Breard then filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief in the federal district court, alleging a violation of inter-
national law because the police failed to notify him of his rights under the
Vienna Convention."3 He argued that had he been able to contact his consu-
late, he might have accepted the State's offer to drop the death penalty in re-
turn for a plea of guilty. The District Court denied relief, stating that his
claim was procedurally defaulted because he had failed to raise it in the state
court." The Court of Appeals affirmed. Breard then filed a petition for cer-
tiorari, an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court and associ-
ated requests to stay his execution.
On April 3, 1998, the Republic of Paraguay filed proceedings in the In-
ternational Court of Justice, alleging that the United States had violated the
Vienna Convention." The International Court issued an order on April 9,
1998, requesting that the United States delay execution until the matter could
be resolved by the International Court."6
On April 14, the day of Breard's scheduled execution, a majority of the
Court in a per curium opinion, and over the dissents of Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Ginsburg, denied both the petition for certiorari and the petition
of a writ of habeas corpus and the related stays. The Governor of Virginia
received a letter from the Secretary of State asking him to halt the execution
but the Governor declined to intervene.
In its per curiam opinion denying certiorari and other relief, the major-
ity agreed with the Court of Appeals that Breard had procedurally defaulted
any claim his rights under the Vienna Conventions were violated, because he
failed to first raise them in state court. The per curiam opinion explained that
this procedural rule (under the AEDPA) trumped the treaty right, because
treaty rights must be exercised in accordance with the procedural rules of the
forum state.' The per curiam opinion observed that even though a treaty is
the supreme law of the land, it could be rendered null and void by a subse-
quent act of Congress. When a treaty and a statute conflict, the most recent
act of Congress governs. Since the AEDPA, which enacted the procedural
default rule was passed in 1996, it therefore took precedence over the Vi-
enna Convention which was ratified in 19 6 9.8
The per curiam opinion went on to observe that even if there had been
no procedural default it would have been extremely doubtful that Breard
482. See id. at 374.
483. See id.
484. See id. at 375.
485. See id. at 376.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 375.
488. See id at 376.
2000]
55
Benner et al.: Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of United States
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
would have prevailed on the merits, since he made no showing that the treaty
violation had any effect on his trial. "'
Justice Souter, in a separate statement, agreed that there was no "rea-
sonably arguable causal connection between the treaty violations and
Breard's conviction and sentence.""a
In dissent Justice Stevens chided the majority for refusing to stay the
execution so that the Court would have the benefit of full briefing under its
normal rules.49" ' Justice Breyer also dissented from the hasty decision, argu-
ing that the novelty of Breard's claim might constitute good cause for his de-
fault and the violation of the treaty might have constituted prejudice since
Breard might have accepted the guilty plea and life sentence had he been
able to talk to officials from his own country."'
Justice Ginsburg also dissented stating that she would have granted a
stay of execution in order to consider" in the ordinary course" Breard's first
federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 93
Angel Breard was executed on April 14, 1998.
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON DEFINITIONS OF CRIME
In Davis v. United States,494 and In re Winship,49 the Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in both federal and state criminal prosecutions. 96 The Winship rule,
along with the closely related requirements of notice and right to trial by
jury, undeniably impose a considerable burden upon state prosecutions and
increase the uncertainty of criminal convictions. To reduce the difficulties
for the prosecution, some legislatures have redefined what formerly had
been elements of offenses into matters of affirmative defenses ( to be proven
by the defendant) or as sentencing issues , thus reducing the impact of the
reasonable doubt standard.4 In its last two terms of the millennium, the Su-
preme Court revisited the issue of how far a state may go in rearranging the
elements of an offense to avoid the heavier burden of proof standard and re-
duce the issues that a jury must decide.
489. See id. at 377.
490. Id. at 379.
491. See id. at 379-80 ( Stevens, J., dissenting).
492. See id at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
493. Id. at 381 (Ginsburg, J,. dissenting).
494. 160 U.S. 469 (1985).
495. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
496. See generally Davis, 160 U.S. 469; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358.
497. See e.g. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977).
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States08
In Almendarez-Torres the Court held that where the legislature, by the
terms of the statute that defines the crime, specifies that a prior conviction
may allow for a substantially heavier penalty, the matter is not ordinarily an
element of the crime, and thus not an issue for trial, but merely a matter for
sentencing."' On the other hand, if the matter is one that makes the offense
more serious, in terms of penalty because of an additional element, other
than a prior conviction, the nature of the crime may have been changed - i.e.
a new offense created - and the matter will be treated as an element. of that
offense to be charged and proven at trial. The difficulty is to distinguish
elements of mere penalty from elements of the crime.
Defendant Almendarez-Torres [hereinafter Torres] was charged with
and convicted of the criminal offense of being in the United States without
permission of the Attorney General, after having been deported.' The sen-
tence maximum for that crime is two years of incarceration. At sentencing
the government introduced evidence that Torres' first deportation was be-
cause of his conviction in the United States of an aggravated felony.50'
Hence, according to the statute the possible sentence for his present violation
of the immigration laws was up to twenty years of incarceration, instead of
only two years.5' Torres was sentenced to seven years, one month of incar-
ceration. He challenged the sentence on the grounds that he was not charged
under the enhanced penalty section of the statute. The prior aggravated fel-
ony conviction was simply introduced at his sentencing. The trial court re-
jected the argument that the prior felony conviction should have been
charged. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme
Court also affTrmed.0 3
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the matter addressed only a sen-
tencing issue and thus need not have been alleged in the indictment. Justice
Breyer wrote the majority opinion which was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Thomas. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.'
The majority, in assessing congressional intent, pointed out that recidi-
vism is a proper and usual grounds for enhancement of sentence and is there-
fore usually only a sentencing matter. The majority concluded that the two-
year sentence provision is part of one subsection of the statute. The twenty-
year sentence provision was in a separate subsection and thus was not in-
498. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
499. See id.
500. See id. at 230.
501. See id.
502. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
503. See id. at 231.
504. See id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tended to describe a greater offense, only a sentencing issue for the crime. 5
The Court also rejected the argument, that an enhanced sentence because of
recidivism required that the prior convictions be charged in the indictment,
although not creating a different crime.'
Justice Scalia in his dissent argued that the plain language of the statute
changes the crime from simple re-entry after deportation for any reason, to
re-entry after conviction of an aggravated felony, and was therefore not sim-
ply a matter addressing recidivism.' In the dissenters' view, the two-year
sentence clause created a lesser-included offense, namely re-entry after de-
portation for whatever reason. Re-entry after deportation for conviction of an
aggravated felony, which carried a possible twenty-year sentence, was a
separate offense having an additional element.
Jones v. United States'
Nathaniel Jones was charged with a federal carjacking offense. The
statute under which he was charged provides for imprisonment of not more
than fifteen years, unless serious bodily injury resulted, in which case im-
prisonment of up to twenty-five years could be imposed.' The indictment
did not allege serious bodily injury; the jury was not instructed on serious
bodily injury as an element of the offense and the jury's guilty verdict did
not include serious bodily injury."' At the sentencing hearing, however, evi-
dence of serious bodily injury was introduced and the judge imposed a
twenty-five-year sentence. The Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court that the sentence enhancer was not an element of the offense, and thus
presented only a sentencing issue. The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4
decision held that serious injury was an element of the offense.' Hence, it
must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt as a jury issue.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Souter, with Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Ginsburg and Stevens joining, addressed the question of how to de-
termine whether a sentence enhancing factor is an element of the offense
rather than merely a sentencing issue where the statute itself does not specify
and indicated the following factors would be considered: (1) Does the sen-
tence enhancer appear to stand alone, away from the elements of the offense,
(2) Does the sentence enhancer require further facts about the basic crime,
(3) Does the sentence enhancer greatly increase the penalties, and (4) Does
the sentence provision come after the word "shall" in the statute? Legislative
history should also be examined. Recidivism and prior convictions are usu-
505. See id. at 236.
506. See id.
507. See id. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
508. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
509. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
510. See Jones, 526 U.S. at 232.
511. See id. at 234.
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ally treated as a sentencing factor. Here the enhancer was bodily injury,
which in the past had been treated as an element in some statutes but a sen-
tencing factor in other statutes. Robbery with bodily injury is most often an
element of the offense in both state and federal systems."' Carjacking is
closely akin to robbery. Hence, the Court concluded that great bodily injury
was an element, which creates a new crime apart from carjacking without
injury and is thus not merely a matter to be considered in sentencing 3 Plain
carjacking is the lesser-included offense.
Perhaps considerably more far reaching than the actual decision is the
discussion in the majority opinion of the constitutional limitations upon a
legislature when rearranging elements to avoid the Due Process Clause.
However, the decision hinges upon statutory construction. In footnote 6, the
Court explicitly stated that, a legislature may not avoid fundamental due
process requirements of notice, right to jury trial, and proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt by "manipulating" elements of the offense with the designa-
tion of an element as a sentencing matter."4 The majority opinion also ar-
gued that perhaps any matters other than prior convictions which the
legislature includes in the statute and which would result in more severe
penalties, are elements of the basic offense and may not be constitutionally
relegated to issues for the sentence hearing. Hence the majority argues, "any
fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury and proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt."5"5 Whether this proposition will survive further
examination by the Supreme Court remains to be seen.
The difference between Almendarez-Torres and Jones appears to be a
difference of statutory interpretation, and the fact that a prior conviction was
the sentence enhancer in Almendarez-Torres but not in Jones. But it should
be kept in mind that Jones is a 5-4 decision. The dissent in Jones of Justice
Kennedy was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices O'Connor and
Breyer."6 The dissent would hold that the issue is one of statutory interpreta-
tion only and conclude that the proper interpretation is that great bodily in-
jury is simply a subject for sentencing.
Brogan v. United States'"
In Brogan, the Court held that when a person questioned by federal
agents as part of a criminal investigation, is asked if he committed the crime
512. Seeid. at238.
513. See id. at 252.
514. See id. at 245, n.6.
515. See id.
516. See id. at 255 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
517. 522 U.S. 398.
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under investigation, a false answer, "no" justifies conviction for knowingly
making a false statement to a federal agent."'
Brogan, was a labor union officer. He was convicted of accepting
unlawful cash payments from employers and making a false statement to
government agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001."9 The false statement
was the answer, "no" when asked by the agents if he had taken payments
from employers. At the time of the questioning, Brogan was not in custody
and he had been advised of the subject of the investigation." The only issue
addressed by the Supreme Court was whether his one word answer "no"
could support a conviction for providing false information to government
agents."'
The majority opinion by Justice Scalia upheld Brogan's conviction for
the false answer. Justices Stevens and Breyer dissented.'
The majority concluded that the false answer "no" to an incriminating
question was proscribed within the plain language of the statute. The major-
ity also concluded that the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause was
not violated by the questioning?" Brogan had not yet been charged, nor was
he in custody at the time of the questioning.
The dissent argued that in light of the statute's legislative history, the
exculpatory "no" answer, although false, was not intended by Congress to be
within the parameter of the statute.' The majority held that when the plain
language of the statute is clear, the Court may not explore legislative his-
tory.'
Muscarello v. United States and Cleveland v. United States526
Both petitioners were charged with "carrying" a firearm "during and in
relation to" a "drug trafficking crime.'n Muscarello carried marijuana in his
truck to a place of sale and unlawfully sold the drug. Police officers found a
handgun in the locked glove compartment of his truck, which Muscarello
admitted he carried for protection in relation to the drug sales. 8 The peti-
tioners in the second case, Cleveland and Gray-Santana, placed several guns
in a bag in the trunk of their car and traveled to a designated spot where they
intended to steal drugs from the sellers. Federal agents stopped them and
518. See id. at 398.
519. See id. at 405.
520. See id.
521. See id.
522. See id. at 415 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
523. See id. at 408.
524. See id. at 415 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
525. See id. at 404.
526. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
527. Id, at 125.
528. See id. at 127.
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their suppliers at the scene, searched both cars and found the guns and drugs.
Cleveland and Gray-Santana were charged with attempted possession of co-
caine. 29 In both cases, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioners had
"carried" a firearm "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime"
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).53
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas, affirmed the Court of Appeals decisions and held that § 924(c)(1) is
not limited to the carrying of a weapon on one's person, but that it also ap-
plies "to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehi-
cle, including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the
person accompanies."53' Looking at the language of the statute, the majority
determined that Congress intended that the phrase "to carry" be construed
under its primary meaning, which includes conveyance in a vehicle, rather
than under its special, slang meaning, "to bear" or "to pack" which is consis-
tent with modem usage of the term. The latter definition, the majority ar-
gued, is a more limited embodiment of the general meaning, and nothing in
the legislative history or the broad purpose of the statute to combat the dan-
gerous combination of weapons and drugs implies that Congress intended
the more limited use of the term. 2 The majority argued that such an inter-
pretation did not equate "to carry" with "to transport," used elsewhere in the
statute, because transporting covered a broader category of actions than that
which the majority defined as "carrying," including the shipping of weapons
to another which one knows will be used in relation to drug trafficking activ-
ity.533 The majority stated that the more narrow interpretation of "to use" in
Bailey v. United States" was given to avoid swallowing the meaning of "to
carry," whereas the broader interpretation of "to carry" presently adopted by
the majority does not run the risk of enveloping "to use.' '""S The majority
pointed out that congressional limitation requiring that the firearms be used
or carried, "during and in relation to" drug trafficking offenses, sufficiently
prevented misuse of the statute.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Scalia and Souter, argued that "to carry" should be limited to
those circumstances where firearms are borne, "in such a manner as to be
ready for use as a weapon." '36 Justice Ginsburg disputed the majority's ar-
gument that usage of "to carry" necessarily included conveyance in a vehi-
cle, pointing out that "to carry" has also often been used to mean carrying on
one's person. An interpretation requiring the firearm to be on or about one's
529. See id.
530. See id.
531. Id. at 126-27.
532. See id. at 129.
533. See id. at 134.
534. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
535. See id. at 136-37.
536. Id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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person, she argued, is fully consistent with the provisions of the statute, and,
given that the statute determines what method of sentencing will be used,
does not create a danger of gaps in coverage.3 Considering that the statutory
provision is not decisively clear, the dissent argued that such ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Justice Ginsburg concluded by
arguing that had Congress intended the broad meaning advocated by the ma-
jority, Congress, "hardly lacks competence to select the words "possesses"
or "conveys" when that is what the Legislature means.""538
X. DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
Campbell v. Louisiana'9
Campbell holds that an indicted white defendant has standing to raise
the issue of exclusion of blacks as forepersons of grand juries, where the trial
judge personally selects the foreperson from among the grand jury venire.'
In Louisiana, the foreperson of the grand jury is selected by the trial
judge from the grand jury venire of the parish (county). The remaining grand
jurors are selected at random from the same venire. The foreperson presides
over deliberations of the grand jury and votes on all bills of indictment pre-
sented to the grand jury. In Evangeline Parish, Louisiana, where Campbell
was indicted and convicted of murder, during the period 1976 to 1993, no
black person ever served as grand jury foreperson, although twenty percent
of the parish population was comprised of black citizens who are registered
voters.'
Campbell moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis of discrimina-
tion in the selection of the grand jury foreperson. The trial court denied the
motion, holding that Campbell, a white person, charged with the murder of a
white person was without standing. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state court, holding Campbell
did have standing."2 The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, was joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer.
In Hobby v. United States,;3 the Court had held that discrimination in
selection of the foreperson in federal grand juries did not confer standing
upon a federally indicted defendant because the foreperson's duties were
ministerial and he was selected by the other grand jurors from among those
537. See id. at 140.
538. Id. at 149.
539. 523 U.S. 392 (1998).
540. See id. at 396.
541. See id.
542. See id. at 397.
543. 468 U.S. 339 (1984).
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already selected to serve as grand jurors.' The Court distinguished Hobby
from the present case in that the foreperson here was specifically added to
the grand jury by the trial judge. In Hobby, the foreperson had been selected
for service on the grand jury, and then selected as foreperson by the grand
jurors. A defendant in the Federal System had no particular interest in the
selection of a foreperson apart from the selection of the grand jurors, since
the foreperson was on the grand jury as a voting member before his election
as foreperson. In Louisiana, the foreperson becomes a voting member of the
grand jury because of his or her selection as foreperson by the trial judge.
The three elements that a defendant must satisfy to have standing to as-
sert another's equal protection rights are: (1) The defendant in fact suffered
an injury, (2) He had a close relationship to the excluded class, and (3) It
was difficult for the persons in the excluded class to assert their own right.'
The first element is satisfied because racial discrimination destroys the integ-
rity of the charging process and raises doubt as to the fairness of the process.
The second element is satisfied because a defendant has a vital interest in the
fairness of the system; and will vigorously litigate the issue to overturn his
conviction. The third element is satisfied because it is improbable that a per-
son who is discriminated against by the grand jury process will attempt to
vindicate his rights because of the extraordinary financial burden he would
suffer, with little or no economic reward if he prevailed.' It is important to
note that it is not Campbell seeking to assert his rights. He is merely assert-
ing the rights of excluded black persons, but with the objective of reversing
his criminal conviction, as well as assuring that the excluded class will have
access to the position of grand jury foreperson.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia dissented. ' They argued that it
served no one's interest to reverse the conviction of a murderer who had
been found guilty by a petit-jury, selected under the Batson v. Kentucky 8
safeguards from a jury venire comprised of a representative cross section of
the community, i.e., a venire that includes people from all significant classes
of persons in the community.'
XI. VENUE
United States v. Cabralesi"
Cabrales was indicted in the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Missouri for conspiracy to avoid a transaction-reporting re-
544. See Campbell, 523 U.S. at 397 (citing Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339).
545. See id. at 400.
546. See id.
547. See id. at 404 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
548. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
549. See Campbell, 523 U.S. at 404.
550. 524 U.S. 1 (1998).
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quirement, conducting a financial transaction to avoid a transaction-
reporting requirement, and engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally
derived property of a value greater than $10,000. 5"' The indictment alleged
that Cabrales had deposited $40,000 in the AmSouth Bank of Florida and
then made four withdrawals of $9500 each over the span of one week. The
indictment also alleged that the money she had deposited and then with-
drawn derived from illegal sales of cocaine in Missouri. Cabrales moved to
dismiss the entire indictment for improper venue." The District Court de-
nied the motion for the first count, but dismissed both the second and third
count. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of both of the money-
laundering charges.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Ginsburg affrmed the Eighth
Circuit's dismissal of the money-laundering charges for improper venue.'
She pointed to Article II, § 2, clause 3, and the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution, as well as Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which all dictate that the accused is to be tried where the crime was commit-
ted. 5 In making such a determination, the majority held that the location
was to be determined by considering the nature of the crime and the location
of the acts constituting it. Though crimes that begin in one state and are con-
tinued or completed in another allow for venue in any of the states where the
criminal activity took place, the Court stated that Cabrales' money-
laundering activity had taken place solely within Florida, making Missouri
an improper venue for trial. 6 As the majority pointed out, the government
had no evidence that Cabrales had acquired the money in Missouri and taken
it to Florida from there. Her involvement in money-laundering had both
commenced and been completed within the state of Florida. The Court also
pointed out that Cabrales was not charged with aiding or abetting, which
could have made her first crime an essential element of the second and pos-
sibly render Missouri an eligible venue. The Court rejected the government's
argument that convenience and the interests of the society victimized by
drug dealers could render Missouri a proper venue.5' The majority pointed
out that Cabrales' conspiracy charge was still pending in Missouri, and that
any acts of money-laundering in Florida could be used in evidence in Mis-
souri as overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, essentially rendering the
dismissal of the money-laundering charges of negligible impact. 8
551. See id. at 4.
552. See id. at 5.
553. See id.
554. See id. at 6.
555. See id.
556. See id.
557. See id. at 9.
558. See id.
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XII. PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey5 '9
Ronald Yeskey was sentenced to serve eighteen to thirty-six months in a
Pennsylvania correctional facility, but as a first-time offender, the sentencing
court recommended he be placed in Pennsylvania's Motivational Boot
Camp, where successful completion would have led to his release on parole
in six months." Due to a medical history of hypertension, Yeskey was re-
fused admission to the program. Yeskey then filed suit against the Depart-
ment of Corrections, claiming their refusal to admit him violated Title II of
the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).56 The District Court
dismissed the claim, holding that the ADA did not cover inmates in state
prisons, but the Third Circuit subsequently reversed.562
Delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia held that
both inmates and state prisons are covered by the ADA.63 Justice Scalia
found that state prisons fall squarely within the ADA's definition of a public
entity as, "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instru-
mentality of a State or States or local government."5" In addition, the Moti-
vational Boot Camp was found to be a "program" which provided a "bene-
fit" to prisoners. 65
The Court also rejected the state's argument that "qualified individual
with a disability" did not apply to individuals held against their will such as
a prisoner, noting that language in the ADA referring to "institutionaliza-
tion" indicated that Congress had intended to cover penal institutions." The
Court declined to address whether application of the ADA to state prisons,
was a permissible exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause or under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because these arguments
had not been considered by the courts below.
XIII. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Swidler & Berlin v. United States 7
In Swidler, Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the court in a 6-3
decision which held that the federal attorney-client privilege protected attor-
559. 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
560. See id. at 208.
561. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
562. See Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 208.
563. See id. at 210.
564. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1213 1(1)(B)).
565. See id.
566. Id. at211-12.
567. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
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ney-client communications from disclosure in criminal proceedings even af-
ter the death of the client." Vincent W. Foster, Jr. consulted with James
Hamilton, an attorney at Swidler & Berlin, in July, 1993, seeking legal rep-
resentation in connection with possible congressional investigation concern-
ing the 1993 dismissal of employees from the White House Travel Office.
Foster had been Deputy White House Counsel when the firings occurred.
During the two-hour meeting with Foster, Hamilton took three pages of
handwritten notes. Foster committed suicide nine days later5 9
In December, 1995, a federal grand jury issued subpoenas to Swidler &
Berlin for Hamilton's handwritten notes taken during the meeting with Fos-
ter." The subpoenas were issued at the request of the Office of the Inde-
pendent Counsel while investigating possible crimes related to the firings.
After reviewing the notes, the District Court concluded that the notes were
protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product privi-
lege, and denied enforcement of the subpoenas."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.'
The Court of Appeals believed that posthumous privilege protecting client
communications was not absolute, noting the well-recognized exception of
allowing disclosure in cases of disputes among the client's heirs. 3 Applying
a balancing test (which was subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court) the
Court of Appeals held that an exception to attorney-client privilege could be
created where the relative importance of the communications to particular
criminal litigation is substantial. The Court also held that the notes were not
protected by the work-product privilege. 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
holding that the attorney-client privilege extended posthumously to bar dis-
closure of confidential attorney-client communications in a criminal pro-
ceeding." The Court pointed out that the attorney-client privilege is one of
the oldest recognized privileges for client communications. Though few
cases directly address the extension of the privilege posthumously, many ju-
dicial references occur through recognition of an exception to the privilege
in cases of testamentary disputes among the deceased client's heirs. 6 Judi-
cial recognition that such circumstances constitute an exception to or waiver
of the privilege supports an implicit recognition that the privilege does ex-
tend posthumously. 7
568. See id. at 401.
569. See id. at 402.
570. See id.
571. See id.
572. See id.
573. See id.
574. See id. at 403.
575. See id.
576. See id.
577. See id.
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In distinguishing the testamentary dispute cases, Chief Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that the testamentary exception allowing disclosure in
cases of disputes among the deceased client's heirs is rationalized as further-
ing the client's intent. 8 This rationale does not apply in cases involving
posthumous disclosure for purposes of criminal litigation. One of the pri-
mary purposes for the privilege is to encourage full and frank communica-
tion between the client and the attorney. For this reason, the privilege serves
a broader purpose than that associated with the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination. The interests of a client therefore extend beyond
the mere desire to avoid criminal liability. A client may need to discuss per-
sonal matters of a sensitive nature with their attorney, which remain sensi-
tive, even after the death of the client. 9 Possible disclosure of the communi-
cations between attorney and client upon the client's death may impede such
full and frank disclosure." Balancing the importance of the information
against the interests of the client in retrospect only creates substantial uncer-
tainty as to when the privilege will apply. Therefore the impact of creating
such an exception, even if only in criminal cases, will be far from marginal.
Prior to death, a client may not know whether privileged communications
will later be sought for criminal or civil matters, potentially creating a chill-
ing effect in both areas. Given such considerations, the Court held that an
exception to the common law privilege for posthumous disclosure in crimi-
nal litigation could thus not be supported "in light of reason and experi-
ence."
58
'
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that though attor-
ney-client privilege ordinarily survives death of the client, it does not inevi-
tably preclude disclosure of the deceased client's communications in crimi-
nal proceedings."n Pointing out that the majority had overvalued the
posthumous interests of the client, Justice O'Connor argued that after the
death of the client, the risk of harm to the client's interests are substantially
reduced and the risk of the client being held criminally liable has been com-
pletely extinguished."3 The chilling effect upon communications between
attorney and client is also exaggerated. At present, several exceptions to the
attorney client privilege exist, e.g., the crime-fraud exception and or excep-
tions for claims related to attorney competence or compensation, reflecting
that under certain circumstances the privilege ceases to operate. In light of
these already existing exceptions, Justice O'Connor concluded that the mar-
ginal potential for increased silence in allowing a posthumous exception for
criminal proceedings is outweighed by the harm which would result from
578. See id.
579. See id.
580. See id.
581. Id. (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)).
582. See id. at 411 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
583. See id. at 412.
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precluding critical evidence which could not be acquired through other
means. 
5
XIV. EXCESSIVE FINES
United States v. Bajalcajian~'
In Bajakajian, a contentiously divided Court held that confiscation by
the United States of defendant's $357,144 in cash, money lawfully earned
and intended for a lawful purpose, violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 86 Bajakajian's crime was his failure to report that he
was leaving the United States with more than $10,000 in cash pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 5316.5' 7
This federal statute requires that a person who takes more than $10,000
in cash out of the United States must report the cash to the govemment.588
The penalty for a willful violation is a fine of not more than $250,000 or up
to 5 years in prison, or both. The statute provides that one who violates the
act "shall... forfeit to the United States any property... involved in such
offense.... .""' The issue here was the forfeiture of the entire $357,144 in
cash that defendant attempted to transport out of the United States without
making the required report. All of the money was earned lawfully and was
being transported to satisfy a lawful debt to a foreign creditor. The act of
transporting the money would have been entirely lawful if reported. The de-
fendant used cash because of his distrust of banks and because of his cultural
experiences.'l Bajakajian pled guilty to the charge but contested the forfei-
ture in a bench trial, arguing that to forfeit the entire $357,144 would be
grossly disproportionate to the offense."' Defendant was sentenced to three
years probation and ordered to pay a $5000 fine. The trial judge allowed for-
feiture of only $15,000 of the total of the $357,144. The government ap-
pealed, demanding all of the funds as the statute provided. Bajakajian did not
appeal. The Circuit Court affirmed the trial court, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed.5"
In the majority opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, the Court held that the forfeiture constitutes
punishment and was excessive when compared to the seriousness of the of-
584. See id. at414-15.
585. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
586. See id. at 324.
587. See id.
588. See 31 U.S.C. § 5316.
589. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (a)(1).
590. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 326.
591. See id.
592. See id. at 326-27.
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fense 3 The Court defined "excessive," as used in the Eighth Amendment,
as "... surpassing the usual, the proper or normal measure of proportion, 594
and held that forfeiture of the entire amount was disproportionate to the of-
fense.
In the view of the majority, the forfeiture provision constituted punish-
ment because it was part of the sentence to be imposed on one adjudicated
guilty of the non-reporting offense.5 In arriving at this conclusion, the ma-
jority observed there is a difference between the forfeiture here, where the
person of the defendant is before the court, and in rem forfeitures that are
proceedings against the property rather than against an offender, or the prop-
erty owner directly."6 In rem forfeitures may even divest an innocent owner
of his property interest, Bennis v. Michigan. 7 because such forfeitures are
not punishment, but are ordered because the property is the instrumentality
of the crime, or is contraband. It is property sullied by the crime. 3 Here,
transporting the money was not criminal and the money did not represent ill-
gotten gains. Nor was the money to be used in a criminal conspiracy. There-
fore the money was not an instrumentality of any crime.5 9
The dissent by Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia was harsh in its condemnation of the majority opin-
ion.' It noted that the parameters of what constitutes punishment is largely a
legislative matter. In that context, the dissent argued that the harm addressed
by the money reporting statute is not merely for the purposes of identifying
how much money leaves the United States. To the contrary, the reporting
statute is a tool in the arsenal against international crime, drug smuggling
conspiracies, money laundering and other activities by organized crime.
Therefore the statute addresses a serious problem and a non-reporting con-
viction may justifiably be viewed as a major offense that requires a severe
penalty.' The dissent also found a greater degree of culpability in the de-
fendant than did the majority, for the cash was well hidden and Bajakajian
repeatedly lied to the authorities, rather than simply fail to report the
money.' In the dissent's view, the Excessive Fines prohibition was enacted
primarily to keep the government from imposing exorbitant fines so that
people who would not otherwise be imprisoned could be targeted and lose
their liberty simply because of their poverty' 3 That presents no problem
593. See id. at 337.
594. Id. at 335.
595. See id. at 344.
596. See id. at 340.
597. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
598. See United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
599. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337.
600. See generally id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
601. See id. at 351.
602. See id. at 352.
603. See id. at 355.
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here because the money was seized by the government at the onset. There-
fore, the dissent argued, the Excessive Fines Clause was not intended to ap-
ply to this money reporting statute.6
XV. DISCOVERY
Strickler v. Greene'5
This case found the Supreme Court at the crossroads of the procedural
default doctrine which applies to federal habeas corpus petitions and the ma-
teriality requirement of the Brady doctrine which determines when a prose-
cutor's failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense violates due
process. Both doctrines require that the defendant prove that he suffered
prejudice as the result of the state's violation of a constitutional standard.
Early in the evening of January 5, 1990, a young co-ed, Leanne
Whitlock, was abducted from a shopping mall, robbed, and eventually mur-
dered.' Tommy Strickler and Ronald Henderson were charged with capital
murder. Although Strickler maintained that Henderson killed Whitlock,
Strickler was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death.' A prosecu-
tion witness, Anne Stoltzfus, testified at the trial that on two separate occa-
sions she had seen Strickler, co-defendant Henderson and an unidentified
blonde female at the mall where the victim was abducted."J Furthermore,
Ms. Stoltzfus stated that she witnessed the actual abduction by these three
people. She identified Strickler and the others as the ones who had abducted
the victim from the mall parking lot.' She stated: "I have an exceptionally
good memory. I had very close contact with [Strickler] and he made an emo-
tional impression with me because of his behavior and I, he caught my atten-
tion and I paid attention. So I have absolutely no doubt of my identifica-
tion. 61 o
She also testified that, she saw a shiny dark blue car at the mall, with
Ms. Whitlock driving, singing, well dressed, beautiful, and happy."" Then,
"Mountain Man" [Strickler] came tearing out of the mall entrance, pounded
on the passenger window, shook the car, yanked the door open and jumped
in. He then "started hitting her.., on the left shoulder, on the right shoulder,
and then.., he started hitting her on the head, and.., the Blonde girl got in
the back, and "Shy guy" [Henderson] followed and got behind him."6"2
604. See id.
605. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
606, See id. at 268.
607. See id.
608. See id. at 274-75.
609. See id. at 275.
610. Id. at 272-73.
611. See id. at 274.
612. Id. at 275.
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Although the Prosecutor maintained that he had turned over his entire
file in the case to the defense, absent from the file were notes taken by De-
tective Claytor of interviews with Ms. Stoltzfus, and letters from this witness
to the detective about the case." As Justice Stevens put it, writing for the
majority, these notes and letters "cast serious doubt on Stoltzfus' confident
assertion of her exceptionally good memory."6 4
One document was a letter, written by Stoltzfus three days after the first
interview with the detective, "to clarify some of my confusion for you." In
this letter Stoltzfus states that she had not remembered being at the mall, but
that her daughter had helped jog her memory as to that event.6 5 Another
document was a note written by Detective Claytor after his initial interview
with the witness. This note states that Stoltzfus could not identify the victim
in this case."6 Yet a subsequent note from Stoltzfus to Claytor states that af-
ter spending several hours with the victim's boyfriend looking at current
photos she was able to identify the victim Leanne Whitlock as the woman
she had seen in the car at the mall "beyond a shadow of a doubt." 617 Another
document shows that she could not identify any of the white males in-
volved."' Other documents describe her "muddled memories" and thank the
detective for his patience with her.19
In his federal habeas petition Strickler asserted that the prosecution had
violated its duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense under Brady v.
Maryland."° The District Court agreed, but the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Strickler had procedurally defaulted this
claim because counsel could have raised it in state court.
In the Supreme Court Justice Stevens reaffirmed the prosecutor's duty
under Brady and Kyles v. Whitley,62 to determine whether there may be evi-
dence favorable to the defense which is held by the police. Steven also found
that because defendant's trial and appellate counsel reasonably relied upon
the prosecutor's open file policy, there was cause for Strickler's failure to
raise the claim in state court. Indeed Strickler's habeas counsel did not un-
cover the impeaching documents until the federal district court granted a
613. See id. at 276.
614. Id.
615. See id.
616. See id.
617. Id. at 274.
618. See id. at277.
619. Seeid. at278.
620. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution). Subsequent
cases have held that the duty to disclose exists even in the absence of a specific request by the
defense. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.97 (1976). Evidence which would constitute
impeachment of a state's witness is also considered "favorable" evidence. United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
621. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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sweeping discovery order which it may well not have had the authority to
order."' The Achilles heel for Stickler, however, was the requirement that he
prove he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's failure to make the disclosure at
trial. This requirement that prejudice be shown is an aspect of both the ha-
beas procedural default doctrine and the Brady doctrine. As Justice Stevens,
explained under Brady's tripartite test, the evidence must be favorable to the
accused, it must have been suppressed by the state, and prejudice must have
ensued. Justice Stevens acknowledged that Stoltzfus' testimony was "preju-
dicial" in the sense that it made his conviction more likely than it would
have been without it. But that is not the test. Rather, Stevens said, the defen-
dant must convince the court that "there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had
been disclosed to the defense.6 3 Stressing that the adjective "reasonable" was
important, Stevens cautioned that this did not mean that the defendant had to
prove that a different verdict would have been more likely than not, had the
suppressed evidence been admitted. Rather, the question is whether "the fa-
vorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict."'6
Despite the important of the eyewitness account so confidently relayed
by Ms. Stoltzfus, Stevens nevertheless concluded, based upon the other evi-
dence in the case, that there was no reasonable probability that Strickler's
conviction or death sentence would have been different had the impeaching
material been available to the defense.' Thus the defendant could not show
materiality under the Brady doctrine, nor could he show prejudice under the
procedural default doctrine.
Justices Souter and Kennedy concurred in part and dissented regarding
the issue of prejudice.6 The dissenters argued that the short hand formula-
tion of the test and the use of the words "reasonable probability" created an
unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into believing the standard was more
demanding than it was. They therefore would use the words "significant pos-
sibility" to describe "the degree to which the undisclosed evidence would
place the actual result in question .... ,'27 In their view, Stoltzfus' testimony
was critical because she told a gripping story which placed Strickler as the
"madly energetic leader of two morally apathetic accomplices, who were
passive but for his direction." 28 Citing jury research which "redoundingly
proves that the story format is the key to juror decision making" the dissent-
ers argued that one could not be 'reasonably confident" that Strickler's death
622. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 287, n.28 and n.29.
623. Id. at 289-90.
624. Id.
625. See id. at 292.
626. See id. at 298 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
627. Id.
628. Id. at 307.
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sentence would have been the same had the defense been able to impeach
the credibility of that story. 29
XVI. EVIDENCE: THE CHANGING APPROACH TO EXPERT TESTIMO4Y
A. Historical Perspective
We all rely upon expertise of others in our daily lives, whether it be a
salesperson in a home improvement center, a car mechanic or the pharmacist
at the drug store. Trials are no different. Experts who have acquired knowl-
edge through training, research or experience beyond the common range of
knowledge are necessary to assist the jury in its role as the trier of fact. The
problem often faced by courts, however is how to determine when some-
thing posing as "scientific" evidence is is fact valid and reliable.
By the mid-1970s the most dominant rule for the qualification expert
testimony at trial required that the method or procedure used by the expert in
arriving at an opinion had to have gained general acceptance in its own field
in order to be admissible. Hence, if the theory upon which the opinion was
based was untested or the device or technique used to arrive at the opinion,
was still experimental, the opinion was not admissible. This rule for the
qualification of expert testimony was identified most closely with the deci-
sion in Frye v. United States30 and was referred to as the Frye test.
This rule never gained universal acceptance. Some courts had taken the
position that general acceptance was not necessary, as long as the person
rendering the opinion had sufficient credentials to warrant the court receiv-
ing the opinion. The opponent, of course, was free to introduce experts to
contradict the opinion directly, or to attack the process by which the opinion
was derived. Thus the jury was left to sort out the battle of the experts. In
1975, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ( FRE 702) was enacted which made no
mention of the Frye general acceptance test.
B. FRE 702 Supersedes Frye
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1 the Supreme Court
interpreted FRE 702, holding that it displaced the Frye test. It should be
noted that Daubert does not apply to expert testimony in state courts. Of
course, one may find state courts adopting the United States Supreme
Court's approach. Daubert also expanded the rights of litigants to use expert
witnesses. But Daubert did not leave the door wide open. Instead it dele-
gated to trial courts the discretion to include or exclude an expert's testi-
mony, creating the so-called "gatekeeper" role for trial judges.
629. See id.
630. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
631. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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In Daubert, plaintiffs alleged that the Daubert brothers were born with
serious birth defects because their mother had taken Bendectin, a prescrip-
tion drug given to relieve nausea during her pregnancy. 2 The mother took
the drug pursuant to her physician's direction. Merrell Dow, the defendant
who marketed the drug, moved for summary judgment. In support, Merrel
Dow filed depositions of its expert witnesses asserting that in more than 30
studies of the drug's impact upon pregnant mothers, none found that the
drug caused damage to a fetus. 3 The Dauberts did not directly attack those
studies. Instead, they presented the affidavits of eight experts who, based on
studies with animals, and comparison of the ingredients of Bendectin with
substances having similar ingredients which were known to cause birth de-
fects, rendered opinions that the ingestion of Bendectin caused the birth de-
fects at issue.' The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the Frye standard was not satisfied by the plaintiff's
proffer of evidence because the animal studies and chemical structure analy-
ses relied upon by plaintiff's experts had not received general acceptance in
the scientific community, when applied to humans. The Appellate Court,
also relying upon the Frye rule, affirmed, concluding that the analysis of the
plaintiff's experts had not been published, had not been subjected to peer re-
view, and was without general acceptance.633 The United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, consistent with Fed.
Rule of Evidence 702. The Supreme Court concluded that 702 established a
different standard from the Frye test and thus superseded it.36
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that FRE 702 requires
only that the evidence offered through an expert be relevant and reliable and
beyond the ordinary experience of jurors.637 FRE 702 thus differed from Frye
in that it did not require general acceptance as a necessary precondition to
admissibility, although the fact of general acceptance in the scientific com-
munity alone may be sufficient to justify admission of the testimony." Not-
ing that FRE 702 established a flexible inquiry, the Court explained that
many factors, in addition to general acceptance, could be used by trial judges
in exercising their discretion to exclude or admit expert evidence under FRE
702. Such factors would include such as whether the theory or technique re-
lied upon has been tested, whether the error rate for the technique is known
and whether it has been the subject of peer review and publication. 39
632. See id. at 582.
633. See id.
634. See id. at 584.
635. See id.
636. See id. at 585.
637. See id. at 591.
638. See id. at 597.
639. See id. at 592-94
(Vol. 36
74
California Western Law Review, Vol. 36 [1999], No. 2, Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss2/11
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT
C. Standard of Review
General-Electric Co. v. Joiner'0
In General-Electric Co. v. Joiner," the Court resolved the issue of what
standard an appellate court is to use when reviewing a trial judge's ruling on
the admissibility of expert testimony." 2 The Court adopted the abuse of dis-
cretion standard. Under that standard, if the trial judges' ruling is supported
by evidence, the reviewing court should defer to the trial court and affirm
that ruling, although there is evidence that would also support a contrary rul-
ing.6
3
Joiner had been employed as an electrician with a Georgia municipal
utility department. His duties, he alleged, required him to sometimes work
with liquids that occasionally contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB).'
PCB production and sales had been banned by Congress because of the be-
lief that human exposure to the substance was dangerous and may cause
cancer. However, quantities of PCB remained in the public domain from dis-
tribution prior to the congressional ban.' 5 Joiner eventually developed lung
cancer, and in his lawsuit alleged that his exposure to PCB contributed to his
lung cancer.' In fact Joiner was a smoker, and Joiner's family had a history
of lung cancer, although no one had developed the disease at so young an
age. 7 The District Court ruled that Joiner's proffered experts were excluded
as witnesses at trial because their opinion that his exposure to PCB caused,
or contributed to Joiner's type of cancer, was unsupported by the research
involving the human species. Joiner's experts' opinions were based upon
studies with animals where a large quantity of PCB was directly injected into
the stomach of the animal, which then developed cancer." Joiner's evi-
dence, at best, showed his exposure to diluted minimal amounts of PCB,
generally only external exposure, and over an extended period of time.
The Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the trial court; but the Su-
preme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court." The Supreme Court
explained that a reviewing court is to examine the trial judge's ruling only
within the limits of the abuse of discretion standard." ° That means that the
reviewing court is not to decide whether, based upon the supporting evi-
640. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
641. Id.
642. See id. at 139.
643. See id.
644. See id.
645. See id. at 140.
646. See id.
647. See id.
648. See id. at 145.
649. See id. at 149.
650. See id. at 139.
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dence, it would have admitted or excluded the proffered expert testimony.
The only question to be addressed by the reviewing court was whether or not
there was a reasonable basis for the trial judge's decision. If so, that decision
is to be affirmed, whether the decision is to allow the expert testimony, or
excludes the testimony. The abuse of discretion applies equally when the rul-
ing of the trial judge on admissibility ends the litigation, or merely excludes
some of the evidence, with the trial still to go forward."'
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Joiner's
experts. The animal tests relied upon presented dissimilar situations from
that of Joiner's: first, because only animals were tested, second, there was a
vast difference in quantity and kind of exposure between the test animals and
Joiner's experience. The Court also concluded that the epidemiological stud-
ies also relied upon by Joiner's experts, while presenting similar situations to
Joiner's, were not sufficient to serve as foundation for opinion evidence be-
cause the higher than expected cancer rates shown in those studies were not
sown to be statistically significant.' Hence, the trial judge's ruling exclud-
ing the Joiner experts was upheld.
Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd v. Carnichae653
In Kuhmo, the Supreme Court again addressed FRE 702 in light of
Daubert.4 This time, the Court extended Daubert's flexible inquiry to all
expert testimony, not merely scientific experts such as those involved in
Daubert.6" The Court also provided further guidance for evaluating the ad-
missibility of expert testimony.
In Kuhmo, plaintiff Carmichael purchased a used motor vehicle. While
driving the vehicle, a tire blew out causing an accident and injuring the Car-
michaels." 6 The errant tire was steel-belted, made in 1988 and installed in
the vehicle some time before Carmichael purchased the used vehicle in
March of 1993.' The accident occurred two months after purchase, and
Carmichael had driven the vehicle some 7000 miles. 8 The Carmichaels' ex-
pert witness admitted that the tire in question was badly worn and had at
least two punctures, which had been inadequately repaired. 9 Nevertheless,
based upon his examination of the tire, the expert testified in his deposition
that, in his opinion, the tire blew out because of a manufacturing or a design
651. See id. at 144.
652. See id. at 146-47.
653. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
654. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
655. See Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 141.
656. See id. at 142.
657. See id.
658. See id. at 143.
659. See id.
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defect.'6 Even with the tires' wear, he believed it should not have blown out.
The expert conceded that if the tire was not operated at the correct inflation
level, that could have caused a blowout."' However, he concluded that from
his observation of the tire, it was operated at correct inflation. The witness
explained the factors he relied upon in arriving at his conclusion regarding
the inflation level of the tire during operation. These factors were four char-
acteristics apparent in a tire operated at an incorrect inflation level." Two of
the four characteristics were present, according to the Carmichael expert, but
he still maintained that in his opinion the tire had been used with the proper
inflation. 3 Kuhmo moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted
on the basis that the Carmichael expert's testimony was inadmissible at
trial.'
The Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, but again the Supreme Court upheld
the decision of the District Court excluding the expert testimony.6 First, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Carmichaels that one may qualify as an ex-
pert although not be a scientist, because the subject of expert testimony of-
fered under FRE 702 is not limited to scientific opinion. Persons who have
technical or other specialized knowledge may qualify as an expert witness
and give opinion evidence.' Expertise may arise from observations and ex-
periences as well as specialized education and training. To qualify as an ex-
pert, the witness must have education and/or experiences that are beyond
that acquired by ordinary people.
Carmichaels' expert has an M.S. degree in mechanical engineering, had
worked for 10 years for Michelin America, Inc. and had been qualified as an
expert on tire blowouts in other court cases. 7 However, the trial judge did
not exclude the expert's evidence because the witness was not a scientist nor
because the witness was without specialized knowledge. The evidence was
excluded primarily because of the trial judge's distrust of the procedure the
expert used to arrive at his conclusions.s The Carmichaels' expert had
agreed with the defendants that the tire should have been replaced because of
its condition before the blowout. He also noted that two tire punctures had
been inadequately repaired. He conceded that there was evidence of im-
proper inflation of the tire and that improper inflation could cause the tire to
blow out.' The expert could not, or did not, cite any experiments or tests
which supported his theory that the tire had been properly inflated. In addi-
660. See id.
661. See id.
662. See id. at 143-44.
663. See id. at 144.
664. See id. at 145.
665. See id. at 160.
666. See id. at 148.
667. See id. at 154.
668. See id.
669. See id. at 154-55.
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tion a critical factor that appeared to motivate the trial judge's decision was
the fact that the witness arrived at his opinion after initially only examining
photographs of the tire. 70 The witness did examine the tire on the day of his
deposition, just before the deposition. By then, however, the expert was
committed to testify for the plaintiffs. Given the poor condition of the tire
before the blowout and the evidence of incorrect inflation, the trial court's
decision to exclude the plaintiff's expert was therefore not an abuse of dis-
cretion.6"
The Court also elaborated upon the factors to be considered when evaluat-
ing proffered expert testimony noting that the factors suggested in Daubert
were intended to be "helpful, not definitive."' In sum, the Court noted that
the trial judge was to be given "considerable leeway in deciding in a particu-
lar case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable."673
D. Polygraph Evidence
United States v. Scheffer 74
Edward Scheffer, an airman stationed at March Air Force Base in Cali-
fornia, volunteered to work as an informant in drug investigations for the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI) in March 1992.75 His supervi-
sors informed him that he would be required to submit to periodic drug test-
ing and polygraph examinations. In early April, Scheffer submitted to a
urine test. Shortly thereafter, he was given a polygraph examination, which
was administered by an OSI examiner. The examiner found that the test in-
dicated no deception on Scheffer's part in his denial of any drug use since
joining the Air Force.676 On April 30, Scheffer failed to appear for work and
could not be found on the base. He was absent without leave until May 13,
when he was pulled over by an Iowa state patrolman for a routine traffic
stop, arrested, and returned to the base where he was tested for drug use.6'
The results of Scheffer's urinalysis, which indicated the presence of meth-
amphetamine, were later revealed to OSI agents. 8
Scheffer was tried by general court martial on several charges, including
use of methamphetamine. At trial, he relied on an "innocent ingestion" the-
ory. The prosecutor attempted to impeach Scheffer's testimony on cross-
670. See id. at 156.
671. See id. at 160.
672. Id. at 151.
673. Id. at 152.
674. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
675. See id. at 305.
676. See id. at 306.
677. See Id.
678. See id.
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examination by pointing out inconsistencies between Scheffer's trial testi-
mony and earlier statements Scheffer made to OSI officials. Scheffer then
attempted to bring in the polygraph evidence to support his testimony that he
did not knowingly ingest drugs while in the Air Force.679 Military Rule of
Evidence 707 prohibits admission into evidence of the results of a polygraph
examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an of-
fer to take, or failure to take, a polygraph exam."' The military judge found
Rule 707 to be constitutional and denied Scheffer's motion. Petitioner was
convicted on all counts.6 ' The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
in all material respects. The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces reversed, however, holding that a per se exclusion of the evidence
violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.'
A sharply divided Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, upheld
the exclusion of polygraph evidence in this case, but failed to command a
majority for a per se rule of blanket exclusion. Delivering the judgment of
the Court, Justice Thomas wrote an opinion which studiously avoided defin-
ing the constitutional source of a defendant's right to present a defense. " In
the portion of his opinion which was joined by eight members of the court,
he concluded that Rule 707 had not precluded the defendant from introduc-
ing any factual evidence in his defense. He had simply been deprived of ex-
pert opinion which would have bolstered his credibility on the witness stand.
64 Therefore the defendant's right to present a defense with respect to all
facts relevant to the charged offense had not been "significantly impaired"
by the exclusion of the polygraph evidence.'
In reaching this conclusion Justice Thomas distinguished three prece-
dents upon which the Court of Appeals had relied: Rock v. Arkansas,"6
Washington v. Texas, 7 and Chambers v. Mississippi.8 In all three cases
Thomas and the majority found, the exclusion of evidence was unconstitu-
679. See id.
680. See id. at 307 (citing Military Rule of Evidence 707).
681. See id.
682. See id.
683. Thomas noted that the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces relied upon the Sixth
Amendment without pointing to any particular language in the text of the Amendment, and in
a footnote observed that the defendant claimed the source of the right lay in the Sixth
Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause and the "combined effect" of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. id. at 307, n.3.
684. See id. at 317.
685. Id.
686. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). Rock held that a defendant whose memory had been hypnoti-
cally refreshed could not be barred by a statute banning such assisted testimony, from testify-
ing that the killing had been accidental.
687. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). Washington held that the Sixth Amendment was violated by a
rule that barred co-defendants from testifying to events they had personally observed.
688. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Chambers held that due process was violated by a common
law evidentiary rule which prevented a party from presenting testimony which impeached its
own witness.
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tional because a witness had been precluded from testifying to facts about
the crime itself. Here, while admitting that the raw data from the polygraph
concerning pulse rate, respiration and perspiration were factual, the expert's
opinion testimony was not factual evidence about the accused's conduct
concerning the crime with which he was charged."8 9
In the portion of his opinion which garnered only a plurality,' Thomas
asserted that a defendant's right to present relevant evidence is subject to a
reasonableness requirement, and therefore must bow to other legitimate in-
terests in the criminal trial process, so long as the rules designed to promote
these other interests are neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to promoting
the desired ends.69" ' According to Justice Thomas, Rule 707's prohibition on
the use of polygraph evidence serves several legitimate purposes related to
the criminal trial process. The first of these is the need to ensure that the trier
of fact is presented with reliable evidence.6' The reliability of polygraph
evidence, however, is a matter of dispute within the scientific community
and among state and federal courts. In light of such vast disagreement, Jus-
tice Thomas concluded that Rule 707's blanket prohibition of such evidence
was both a rational and proportional means of furthering the legitimate inter-
est of barring unreliable evidence. Second, the plurality found that Rule 707
preserves the jury's core function of making credibility determinations. Reli-
ance on polygraph evidence at trial may diminish this particular role where
the aura of infallibility associated with polygraph tests prompts jurors to dis-
regard their duty to weigh the evidence and assess credibility themselves."3
Finally, the plurality asserted, Rule 707 operates to ensure that litigation per-
tains to issues associated with guilt or innocence, rather than collateral issues
pertaining to the reliability of the polygraph results or the qualifications of
the examiner administering the test.
694
Four Justices (Kennedy, O'Connor, Ginsburg and Breyer) concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment.695 Writing on their behalf, Justice Ken-
nedy emphasized that various courts could come to different conclusions as
to the reliability of polygraph evidence in light of the surrounding contro-
versy and for that reason, the Court would be unwise to invalidate Rule
707.69. Justice Kennedy warned against the use of a per se exclusion of such
evidence, however, pointing out that future cases may present a stronger ar-
gument for including polygraph evidence at trial. In addition, the concurring
689. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 317, n.13.
690. Justice Thomas was joined in this part by the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and
Souter. See id at 305.
691. Seeid. at308.
692. See id. at 309.
693. See id. at 313.
694. See id. at 314.
695. See id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer join in
Kennedy's concurrence).
696. See id.
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opinion took issue with Justice Thomas' asserting that allowing expert opin-
ion based upon polygraph evidence would diminish the jury's core function
of assessing credibility.6 ' Finding Justice Thomas' attempt to "revive this
outmoded theory... especially inapt in the context of the military justice
system," Justice Kennedy observed that under the Military Rules of Evi-
dence, no restrictions are placed upon the presentation of opinions or conclu-
sions as to the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. 8 Therefore,
an argument to exclude polygraph evidence based on the need to keep a
polygraph examiner's opinion on the ultimate truthfulness of the accused
from the trier of fact was not persuasive.
Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter,' pointed out that per se exclusion of
polygraph evidence, no matter how reliable, was inconsistent with the
"flexible inquiry" dictated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals."M In
particular, the special role polygraph examinations play in the military, as
opposed to that in the civilian sector of society, argues for greater admissi-
bility because of the procedures and guidelines in place to ensure a reliable
result. Justice Stevens argued that in light of the substantial reliability of
military polygraph exams, as well the ability of a military juror to compe-
tently assess the reliability of the results and their relevance to the issues of
the trial, the advancement of legitimate interests emphasized in Justice Tho-
mas' opinion was minimal at best."'
Justice Stevens also emphasized the fundamental nature of the right of
the accused to present a defense, which he believed was barely touched upon
in the majority opinion.7' Justice Stevens argued that blanket exclusion of
evidence which may have proved potentially illuminating, without any fur-
ther inquiry into the specific evidence sought to be admitted, impeded the
ability of the accused to fully present a defense." 3
He further argued that a legitimate interest in barring presentation of un-
reliable evidence to the trier of fact could not justify a per se exclusionary
rule. " Exclusion of potentially reliable evidence is constitutionally required
to be proportional to the purposes served by the exclusion.0" Justice Stevens
argued that the majority failed to consider interests on both sides of the bal-
ance, essentially ignoring the interests of the defendant in such cases. The
defendant, for example, has a strong interest in providing corroborating evi-
dence from a third party, which may be more readily believed by the jury
than the words of the accused. Prohibiting the presentation of such evidence
697. See id.
698. Id. at 319-20.
699. See id. at 320 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
700. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
701. See id. at 325.
702. See id. at 326.
703. See id. at 327.
704. See id. at 330.
705. See id. at 331.
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therefore greatly impairs the ability of the defendant to make a meaningful
defense.
In reviewing the legitimate interests advanced by Justice Thomas, Jus-
tice Stevens found that the interests of the defendant were substantially
greater.7" First, the reliability of polygraph evidence is often great, and ad-
missible under Daubert, which requires no specific degree of accuracy."
Second, the jury's role in making credibility judgments includes making
judgments on matters presented by third party witnesses, and the average
jury is intelligent enough to do that with respect to polygraph evidence."'
Third, the desire to eliminate collateral proceedings is an inadequate justifi-
cation for eliminating the use of polygraph evidence because collateral pro-
ceedings arise concerning the presentation of testimony of any expert wit-
ness on any subject-matter."° Though Justice Thomas' rationale may find
support in specific instances, Justices Stevens thus concluded that a blanket
prohibition clearly cannot be supported, especially since it could substan-
tially limit a defendant's ability to present a meaningful defense."' A de
facto majority of the court (Justices Stevens, Kennedy, O'Connor, Ginsburg
and Breyer) thus would not permit a per se blanket exclusion of all poly-
graph evidence when offered by the defense.
XVII. PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
Saenz v. Roe"1
In a case with a potential for far reaching ramifications, the Supreme
Court breathed new life into the long dormant Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.712 That clause provides: "No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties. of citizens of the United States."' Not to be confused with a similarly
worded clause in Article IV of the Constitution, which prohibits a State from
unfairly discriminating against nonresident citizens of other States, this mys-
teriously undefined section of the Bill of Rights protects freedoms that all
Americans share by virtue of their status as citizens of the United States.
One of the undisputed privileges of national citizenship is the right to
travel to any State in the nation and establish residence there. The Supreme
Court, by a 7-2 vote, held in Saenz that a State cannot abridge that privilege
706. See id. at 339.
707. See id. at 333.
708. See id. at 336.
709. See id. at 337.
710. See id.
711. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
712. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§1.
713. Id.
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of national citizenship by treating newcomers to a State differently from
long-term residents."' At issue in the case was a prominent feature of former
California Governor Pete Wilson's welfare reform effort which barred new
residents for one year from receiving greater benefits than they would have
received in the State of their prior residence.7"5 This restriction on the state's
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program was made opera-
tive through congressional authorization under the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.716
Touted as a necessary measure to prevent California from becoming a
"welfare magnet" the broad gauged provision nevertheless applied across the
board to all newcomers even if they were not welfare recipients in their for-
mer State.717 Thus a woman coming from Oklahoma to take a job in Long
Beach would receive only about half of the normal monthly benefit if she
became unemployed during her first year of residency. A mother and child
coming from Colorado to escape from domestic abuse would likewise re-
ceive substantially less than the amount legislatively determined to be the
minimum essential to meet the cost of living in California. Even a life long
resident of California who left to take a job in Mississippi but returned un-
employed after several months would receive only the Mississippi rate of
$144 for a family of four, instead of California's $673.
The ACLU, supported by a broad coalition, including the American Bar
Association, Professor Laurence H. Tribe of Harvard, religious organizations
and groups serving domestic violence survivors, challenged this discrimina-
tory treatment, arguing that it violated one of the core values of our Constitu-
tion: The right to choose to become a citizen of any State without hindrance
or penalty.
In light of the obvious lack of equal treatment between similarly situ-
ated residents of the same state, court watchers naturally thought the Su-
preme Court would resolve this case under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Encrusted by years of precedents, which have
resulted in a dizzying array of standards, the Court's multi-tiered analysis of
claims under the Equal Protection Clause, however, has become a game of
indecipherable semantics. Avoiding that thicket, the Court instead found that
the discriminatory classification violated the "right to travel." '
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer, delivered the majority opinion striking down the Cali-
fornia restriction. The Court delineated three general classes of cases that
may implicate the constitutional right to travel.1 9 This included (1) the right
of a citizen of one state to freely enter and leave another state, (2) the right
714. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492.
715. See id.
716. See id. at 496.
717. See id. at 492.
718. See id. at 503.
719. See id. at 501.
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of a citizen to be treated as a welcome visitor while temporarily present in
another state, and (3) the right of a citizen to travel to another state and be-
come a permanent resident there with equal status as other citizens of that
state."'
Finding that the length of time an individual had spent in the state was
unrelated to the need for welfare, the Court concluded that the discrimination
against newcomers operated as a penalty on the right to travel which was un-
justified by any substantial state interest."' The Court rejected the state's ar-
gument based on fiscal policy as unconvincing and reiterated its holding in
Shapiro v. Thompson 2 that states may not discriminate in order to deter the
migration of needy families to their state." Citing Justice Cardozo, Stevens
concluded "the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together [be-
cause] in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not divi-
sion."7"
The right to travel is one of the few rights universally acknowledged as
falling within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Apart from that, however, there is little agreement as to
what constitutes the Privileges or Immunities of national citizenship. The
phrase "privileges and immunities" can be traced back to the beginnings of
the American Revolution when the colonists protesting the Stamp Act re-
peatedly asserted that they were entitled to the same fundamental rights as
those enjoyed by English citizens.
There is a growing consensus that at a minimum certain fundamental
provisions of the Bill of Rights which have been incorporated into and made
part of due process should also be considered privileges or immunities of na-
tional citizenship."z While it is beyond the scope of this brief survey to ex-
plore the ramifications of that idea fully, using the different text of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause would allow courts to write on a clean slate and
escape from the shackles of the due process based precedents, which cur-
rently apply selected provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states. Indeed,
differences between the operative terms in the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the Due Process Clause could make a significant difference in
how a particular right is applied. For example while the Due Process Clause
protects against the "deprivation" of certain fundamental rights, the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause protects against "abridgement." That this differ-
ence is no small matter can be seen by comparing Saenz with Conn v. Gab-
720. See id. at 501-03.
721. See id. at 504.
722. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
723. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507.
724. Id. at 511.
725. See MiCHAIL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AN THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2, (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992); Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz San Prophecy:
Does the Privileges and Immunities Revival Portend the Future- Or Reveal the Structure of
the Presence?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110 (1999).
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bert."6 The Court in Gabbert, employing a due process analysis, was unable
to give relief against calculated interference with the attorney-client relation-
ship because the conduct did not "deprive" the attorney of any liberty or
property interest. The Court noted that the cases relied upon by Gabbert in-
volved a "complete prohibition" of the right to engage in a calling. By con-
trast, in Saenz, there was no prohibition whatsoever on the right to travel to
California.72 At most, the restriction on the amount of the welfare benefit
merely chilled that privilege and therefore constituted an abridgement. Had
the attorney's right to engage in a lawful calling in Gabbert been viewed as a
right protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the issue likewise
would have been whether the government's conduct "abridged" that privi-
lege. It is not altogether obvious that the same result would have been ar-
rived at under this different form of constitutional analysis.
It is of course well known that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was
emasculated in the often criticized 1873 decision in the Slaughter-House
Cases28 and left a dead letter. Perhaps the most significant jurisprudentially
neglect of the twentieth century was the failure to revitalize this Constitu-
tional mandate and develop a coherent theory of substantive rights which are
the birthright of all Americans. Today in light of the increasing control by
government over so many aspects of our lives, the need for well-defined
substantive privileges and immunities in areas such as privacy and decisional
autonomy is clear. It is therefore fitting that in its last full Term of the cen-
tury that the Court resurrected this noble Clause from its entombment. While
some will agree with the dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, that Saenz raises the specter that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause will simply become a tool for inventing new rights, the decision also
presents an opportunity for re-examination, which may allow the Court in
the new millennium to re-commit our nation to the fundamental values
which launched this great experiment in democratic self-government.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
While the 1998-99 Term witnessed the continued deconstitutionaliza-
tion of criminal procedure and showed that the trend toward returning power
to the states to regulate criminal prosecutions has not diminished, unanimity
on the Court was rare. Indeed, in approximately one third of the criminal
cases decided during the term, the Court was sharply divided and in some
cases badly splintered. Justice Stevens, who filed the most dissents of any
justice during the term, was frequently joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice
Souter and (except for the notable departure in Minnesota v. Carter) Justice
Breyer. This block of four Justices generally was seen in opposition to the
726. 526 U.S. 296 (1999).
727. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493, note 1.
728. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
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Chief Justice, who was usually joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. Jus-
tices Kennedy and O'Connor, who are regarded as centrists on the Court,
most frequently sided with the Chief Justice against the rights of criminal de-
fendants. Yet in Mitchell v. United States Justice Kennedy not only provided
the crucial fifth vote, but wrote the opinion upholding the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self incrimination at sentencing. Similarly, in City of Chi-
cago v. Morales and Saenz v. Roe, both Kennedy and O'Connor joined with
the Steven's quartet to form a majority that struck down laws which ad-
versely impacted personal liberty, demonstrating that this Supreme Court is
still capable on occasion of rising to fulfill its traditional role as the guardian
of individual freedom. It would be too much to read into these cases the
glimmerings of a return to the principles which motivated the Warren Court.
With the potential retirement of the Chief Justice in the near future, however,
the prospects for continuing the deconstitutionalization of criminal proce-
dure into the new millennium may well be determined by the Presidential
and Congressional elections in the fall of 2000.79 Would it not be ironic if
future historians record that the seeds for a "new generation of constitutional
ideas,""73 incompatible with the current retrenchment of individual rights,
were planted at the close of the twentieth century in the twilight of the
Rehnquist Court's waning moments.
729. It is of course also possible that both Justices O'Connor and Stevens could retire.
730. Tribe, supra note 725, at 125.
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